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STOCK MARKET, CORPORATIONS AND THEIR 
REGULATION: A FEW GLIMPSES INTO REALITY 
 
P.M. Vasudev* 
 
Now a frank gale of wind go with him, Master Frank, we 
have too few such knight adventurers.  Who would not 
sell away competent uncertainties, to purchase, with any 
danger, excellent uncertainties? Your true knight 
venturer ever does it. 
    ~ Eastward Ho (1605) 
 
Public corporations and the stock market have verily emerged as the 
symbols of the present age, and are among the important institutions in the 
society.  Indeed, the state of the stock market is understood as the 
barometer of general well-being.  The law has a crucial role with respect 
to both corporations and stock market, and this paper examines how the 
legal regime for corporations and the stock market influences corporate 
governance and events in the stock market.  This is done through a case-
study of events at three public corporations – Enron Corp., Sycamore 
Networks and Amazon.com. 
 
The paper is divided into five parts of which the first part sets out the 
theme of the paper, and explains the perspective of the analysis.  The next 
three parts deal respectively with events in Enron, Sycamore Networks 
and Amazon.com.  The concluding part articulates the tendencies 
engendered and encouraged by the present regime, and argues that we 
need a better and more reasonable theory for both the institutions – public 
corporations and the stock market.  A sound and reasonable theoretical 
foundation, which reflects the knowledge we have gained from our 
experience with them and defines with some clarity the role we expect 
                                                 
* Ph. D. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, Sr. Lecturer, Department of Commercial 
Law, The University of Auckland.  The original research for this paper was supported by 
the Institute for International Corporate Governance and Accountability at The George 
Washington University Law School (IICGA), Washington, D.C., and the author 
gratefully acknowledges the support and encouragement extended by IICGA and its 
Founder-Director, Prof. Lawrence E. Mitchell of The George Washington University 
Law School.  
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them to play, is a prerequisite for public policy to effectively guide these 
institutions, and minimize the conflict between them and larger public and 
social interests. 
A. STATE OF CORPORATE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Business corporations are legal entities organized under statutes.  
Delaware, with its loose corporate statute,1  is the popular choice of 
jurisdiction for most listed corporations, and the ones selected for study 
here – namely, Enron, Sycamore Networks and Amazon.com are all 
Delaware corporations.2  Delaware corporate statute engineers 
corporations almost purely as issuers of securities meant for trade in the 
stock market, and adopts a policy of encouraging trade in securities in the 
market.3  It has adopted a philosophy of minimalism with respect to the 
administration of corporations, and eschews efforts to regulate them.4  In 
result, a Delaware corporation can virtually be whatever it decides to be.5 
                                                 
* Sr. Lecturer, Department of Commercial Law, The University of Auckland.  The 
original research for this paper was supported by the Institute for International Corporate 
Governance and Accountability at The George Washington University Law School 
(IICGA), Washington, D.C., and the author gratefully acknowledges the support and 
encouragement extended by IICGA and its Founder-Director, Prof. Lawrence E. Mitchell 
of The George Washington University Law School. 
1 Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1. 
2 Enron Corporation was originally formed in 1930 Nebraksa, and it is not clear if it was 
originally incorporated in Delaware.  Amazon.com was incorporated in 1994 in 
Washington, but shifted to Delaware before it made its public issue in 1997.  Only 
Sycamore Networks, a company formed in 1998 during the Internet boom in the stock 
market, was incorporated in Delaware. 
3 See generally P.M. Vasudev, “Capital Stock, Its Shares and Their Holders: A 
Comparison of India and Delaware” Worldwide Junior Corporate Scholars Forum 
Conference, March 2007 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=913282, June 
2007. 
4 See generally William Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware” (1974) 83  Yale L.J. 663. 
5 The present state of permissiveness in American corporate law is very different from the 
highly regulatory environment in which corporations operated for about a hundred years 
from the formation of the United States in the 1770s until the 1880s.  See generally J.W. 
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A powerful school of opinion favours the present corporate arrangement 
outlined above, and views it as the ideal, a state of perfection.6  Terming 
the Delaware statute as an “enabling” one, representatives of this school 
note appreciatively that it facilitates corporations to “write their own 
tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny 
from a regulator and without effective restraint on the permissible methods 
of corporate governance.”7  In result, corporate law has no influence on 
corporate governance for all practical purposes. 
 
When companies are thus free to devise their own systems of governance, 
the question of incentives and rewards becomes important.  What are the 
incentives which influence public corporations in selecting their 
governance systems?  The answer to this question is, undoubtedly, the 
stock market in which the shares of companies are traded.  The stock 
market has a position of pre-eminence in the present arrangement, and the 
prices which company shares command in the market are a powerful 
influence on corporations.  Achieving increases in share prices, termed 
“shareholder value,” is considered a legitimate corporate objective, and 
managements constantly strive for it.  Indeed, the performance of 
corporate managements is measured by the increase in share prices.8 
 
In making decisions and taking actions, corporations are strongly guided 
by the consideration of how their decisions and actions would be received 
                                                                                                                         
Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780-
1970 (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1970). 
6 For a scholarly debate on whether corporate and securities laws must be regulatory, see 
papers presented at the symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1607-2179. 
7 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 
Colum. L. Rev. 1416 at 1417. 
8 Jack Welch of General Electric is considered an exceptionally successful CEO, and this 
is mostly due to the “shareholder value” that he was able to achieve.  In 1980 when Jack 
Welch became the head of General Electric, its market capitalization, meaning the 
aggregate value of its outstanding shares in the stock market, was $ 14 billion.  It had 
risen to $ 490 billion when he retired in 2001.  Rob Walker, “Overvalued: Why Jack 
Welch isn’t God?” The New Republic, 11 June 2001, also available online: 
http://www.robwalker.net/html_docs/welch.html, June 2007. 
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in the stock market, and how they would impact share prices.  In this stock 
market-centric arrangement, market reaction is a primary consideration for 
corporate managements.  The theory is that the stock market would reward 
good corporate performance with increase in share prices, and conversely, 
punish bad performance by lowering prices.  This phenomenon is termed 
“market discipline,” and is affirmed as an article of faith.9  In this schema, 
the business of a corporation is, at best, collateral, and the stock market 
enjoys the primary position.  Corporate business is relevant only to the 
extent that it influences share prices.  In consequence, the business theme 
of corporations is undermined, and the financial theme gains ascendancy. 
 
B. ISSUE OF SHARES AND GRANT OF OPTIONS BY COMPANIES 
 
The capital stock, representing the pooled resources of many persons, can 
be termed the core of modern business corporations.  Corporations issued 
shares, being units of capital stock, for raising the capital required for their 
business purposes.  The shares had par values, and could only be issued 
for adequate consideration.  Victor Morawetz (1882) accurately summed 
up the underlying principle when he observed: 
 
Every shareholder in a corporation is entitled to insist that every 
other shareholder shall contribute his ratable part of the company’s 
capital for common benefit.10 
 
If this were to be the guiding principle, there would be little question of 
companies issuing shares at varying levels of consideration to different 
persons.  Nor could companies, at their discretion, grant stock options 
which entitle their holders to convert them into shares.  In this setup, the 
capital stock of a corporation is treated with sanctity, and the idea that a 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  “The 
Roles of Market Discipline and Transparency in Corporate Governance Policy” (Paper 
presented by William Wetherell, Director for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, 
OECD, at the Banque de France International Monetary Seminar, 16 May 2003), 
available online: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/4/2717763.pdf, June 2007.  
10 Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, 2d ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1886), Vol. 1, at p. 269. 
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person must pay his or her “ratable part” in order to acquire shares of 
capital stock is the central principle. 
 
The observation of Morawetz also explains the rationale for voting rights 
in corporations.  Contributors of capital had voting rights in proportion to 
the capital contributed by them, and the voting rights empowered them to 
elect or remove the directors who managed the corporations.  Shareholders 
also held most of the other important powers in corporations.11  Shares 
were recognized as valuable, and their issue was closely supervised in 
law.12 
 
But these principles were gradually discarded in American corporate law 
beginning from later nineteenth century, and the law gradually permitted 
corporations to freely issue shares.  The requirement of par value for 
shares was discontinued.  Although the principle that consideration must 
be paid for shares is retained, the standards are diluted to the point of 
meaninglessness.  Any amount of consideration determined by the 
directors is accepted, subject to the exception of fraud.13  Companies are 
also free to issue rights and options with respect to their stock and 
determine the terms of such rights and options.14  By early twentieth 
century, the loose position with respect to issue of shares and options by 
companies, outlined above, had emerged, and Roscoe Pound compared the 
grant of options by companies to feudal lords distributing estates.15 
 
                                                 
11 For a description of shareholder rights in American corporate law until 1880s, see 
Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory” 
(1985) 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173. 
12 See generally Adolf A. Berle, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1930) 44 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1049 at p. 1050-1060. 
13 Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 152. 
14 Ibid. Section 157. 
15 Roscoe Pound, “The New Feudalism” (Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the 
Kentucky Bar Association, 1930) (1930) 35 Com.L.J. 397. 
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The shares of listed companies have market value and salability in the 
stock market.  They also have voting and participation rights.16  Voting 
rights entitle shareholders to elect or remove the directors who are in 
charge of corporate management, and participation rights place 
shareholders in a proprietary position with respect to the assets of 
companies.  Ignoring these crucial characteristics, corporate law has 
discontinued the traditional circumspection with which it treated the shares 
of companies.  Now, it casually empowers corporations to deal with their 
shares virtually as they please.  The events at Sycamore and Amazon.com, 
discussed in the paper, demonstrate some of the implications of the 
prevailing loose legal position. 
 
C. THE STOCK MARKET AND ITS REGULATION 
 
We have noted that share prices in the stock market are understood as the 
disciplining factor for corporations,17 and this leads us to the questions, 
how are share prices supposed to be determined in the stock market and 
how is the market to be regulated?  These questions are especially relevant 
given the history of speculation in the stock market and its habit of 
determining irrational share prices.  These issues with the stock market are 
hardly secrets, and have been well-known from early eighteenth century 
when England had its brush with the South Sea Bubble in 1720.18 
                                                 
16 Participation rights of shareholders, termed “residual claim” in economic theory, entitle 
them to the assets of a company remaining after all its other liabilities have been provided 
for or met. 
17 Mercifully, even the most ardent advocates of libertarianism, mainly the law-and-
economic scholars, do not argue that there is no need to discipline companies.  It is only 
that they profess faith in a crude carrot-and-stick approach that emphasizes the negative 
traits in human character, and attempt to appeal only to such qualities.  This is given the 
term “liberty,” but this version could not be further removed from the ideal of liberty 
expounded by thinkers like John Locke (1632-1704) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826). 
18 “South Sea Bubble” refers to the boom in the London stock market in 1720, initiated 
by runaway increases in the price of the shares of South Sea Company.  The boom soon 
spread to other shares, and the market was in frenzy.  However, the market collapsed 
after a few months, causing all round economic decline.  For a recent account of the 
South Sea Bubble, see Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of 
Financial Speculation (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999). 
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In the 1840s when the first corporate statute was enacted in Britain,19 it 
introduced a system of disclosures by companies.  Companies had to make 
disclosures both at the time of issue of shares by them and on an ongoing 
basis, and this regime was adopted in the United States in the 1930s when 
federal laws were enacted for regulation of the stock market.20  The federal 
regulations mandate extensive disclosures by companies, and the theory is 
that the market will apply the information disclosed by companies to 
determine the prices of their shares. 
 
The informational regime in which companies must make disclosures is 
the lynchpin of securities regulations.  Other than disclosures, securities 
regulations also deal with specific issues which affect the integrity of the 
stock market, such as trading by company insiders and market 
manipulation.  These other provisions, such as those dealing with insider 
trading and manipulation, are special devices for checking specific and 
known ills in the market.  The informational regime, on the other hand, 
defines the philosophy of the market, and is intended to promote market 
order on an ongoing basis, by making information available and 
facilitating the discovery of share prices. 
 
D. THE INFORMATIONAL REGIME AND EFFICIENT MARKETS – AN 
OUTLINE 
 
The informational regime, as we have seen, requires extensive disclosures 
by corporations, and its rationale has been described in the following 
words: 
                                                 
19 Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 & 
111 (U.K.). 
20 A system of financial reporting by public companies was being gradually developed in 
United States when the securities laws were enacted and made the reports mandatory.  In 
this sense, the securities statutes only gave legal shape to the practices that had already 
emerged in the market.  For an account of the development of the informational regime in 
Britain since mid-nineteenth century and its adoption in the United States in the 1930s, 
see P.M. Vasudev, “Equity Pricing, the Informational Regime and Efficient Markets: A 
Historical Perspective” (February 2007). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=969751, June 2007. 
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In a word, a respectable open market appraisal, based on a 
compromise between the opinions of willing buyers and willing 
sellers was what was actually required. 
 
Appraisal necessarily turns on information. If the open market 
view was to approximate a judgment of worth, it became essential 
that some material for such judgment should be provided.21 
 
Regulation mandates extensive corporate disclosures towards this end.  
Companies must file quarterly and annual reports with extensive financial 
and other business data and information.22  The recently-enacted Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 continues with the same theme of disclosure, and goes 
further.  It provides for “real-time disclosure,” and companies must make 
immediate disclosure of important developments.23  As Loss and Seligman 
put it, “[t]here is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of 
disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure.”24 
 
Taking a cue from the informational regime, a section in the economics 
discipline, with doctrinaire loyalty to the principle of laissez-faire and the 
perfection of market processes, formulated the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis a few decades later.  Eugene Fama, a leading proponent of the 
Hypothesis, explained: 
 
An "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are large 
numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with 
each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, 
and where important current information is almost freely available 
to all participants. 
                                                 
21 This description of the informational regime is by Adolf A. Berle, whose writings 
played an important role in the adoption of the regime in the United States in the 1930s.  
Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932) at p. 293. 
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.  Section 13. 
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, Section 409. 
24 Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulations, 5th ed. 
(Frederick, Md: Aspen, 2004) at p. 8. 
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In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent 
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual 
prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and 
on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the 
future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time 
the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic 
value.25 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis predicates that the market will apply the 
information disclosed by companies and arrive at prices that reflect the 
“intrinsic value” of the shares of various companies.  The limited role 
which the informational regime seeks to play is making information 
available to the market and facilitating price determination by the market. 
 
E. CASES SELECTED FOR STUDY 
 
The cases selected for study in the paper – Enron, Sycamore and 
Amazon.com – all bring out the clear intersection between the stock 
market and corporate governance.  They deal with the twin aspects of 
market efficiency and corporate governance, and explain corporate and 
stock market tendencies. 
1. ENRON 
 
Enron, an established energy company, experienced steep increases in its 
share prices during 1996-2001.  The case of Enron is selected for three 
reasons: 
 
• Asymmetry between the business progress reported by the 
company and the rise in its share prices. 
• Business adventurism on the part of Enron in the final years of its 
existence.  Inspired by the high valuations given by the stock 
market to the shares of technology companies, Enron ventured into 
                                                 
25 Eugene Fama, “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” (1965) 21 Financial Analysts 
Journal 55 at p. 56. 
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the broadband business in 1999, and spending hundreds of millions 
of dollars.  This was two years before it filed for bankruptcy in 
2001, and raises questions about corporate responsibility and 
accountability, and the incentives offered by the stock market. 
• Increasing stock market-centricity of governance practices at 
Enron, personified by the application of share prices, rather than 
business results as the yardstick to assess managerial performance. 
2. SYCAMORE NETWORKS 
 
Sycamore Networks was founded in 1998 at the height of the Internet 
boom in the stock market and made two public issues in a span of seven 
months in 1999-2000, at the height of the boom.  The case of Sycamore is 
remarkable for the following reasons: 
 
• The readiness of the investors, during the Internet boom, to pour 
money into the company despite the admitted fact that it had no 
business purpose for which it needed to raise capital. 
• Acquisition of shares by the insiders at a low price, and subsequent 
sale at high prices in the public issue. 
• Subversion of the principle of disclosure in the statutory filings of 
Sycamore, and demonstrating how the principle can be used to 
protect managements against legal action, rather than inform the 
investors. 
• Finally, the mismatch between the business results reported by the 
company and the rise in its share prices during 1999-2000.  Events 
in the market undermine the theory of the informational regime, 
and refute the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
3. AMAZON.COM 
 
Amazon.Com, another technology company and a pioneer in electronic 
commerce, is selected for its demonstration of the following: 
 
• Amazon.com made a small public issue in 1997 during the Internet 
boom, and got its shares listed on stock exchanges.  Like 
Sycamore, Amazon.com also exaggerated the risk factors, and used 
it mostly to protect the interests of the management. 
• By taking advantage of the listing of its shares, Amazon.com 
issued shares of the value of over a billion dollars to acquire new 
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businesses.  But in the next three years, it almost completely 
eliminated the businesses acquired by it, by writing off their value 
from its balance sheet.  We look at the implications of the freedom 
allowed in law for such practices. 
• Like in the case of Sycamore Networks, increases in the price of 
Amazon.com shares were contrary to the dismal business results 
reported by it.  The additional feature in the case of Amazon.com 
is that the market was also apparently guided by the predictions of 
an investment analyst, Henry Blodget, and repeatedly increased the 
prices of Amazon.Com shares, despite the bleak results reported by 
the company.  The behaviour of the market, in the context of the 
prediction made by Henry Blodget, demonstrates the grip that 
sentiment, rather than concrete information has on the stock 
market. 
 
A common thread that runs through the tales of all the three companies is 
the significant dichotomy between their statutory reports on the one hand, 
and the other communications issued by them, on the other.  Forecasts and 
statements in the statutory reports are, at best, sober and sedate (Enron), 
and at worst, gloomy and cynical (Sycamore Networks and Amazon.com).  
But other communications released by the companies around the same 
time, such as press releases and letters to shareholders, were bubbling with 
enthusiasm and optimism about the future.  The contrast between the two 
sets of information from the companies raises questions about which set of 
information guides the stock market. 
 
II. ENRON CORP. 
 
Enron Corp., founded in 1930, is a company of longstanding.  It belonged 
to what might be termed the “old world” business culture where value was 
derived largely from physical assets such as land, buildings and plants, and 
actual earnings.  Enron filed for bankruptcy towards the end of 2001.  The 
1990s, which was the last decade of its business existence, were eventful 
in the history of the company.   In particular, the last five years since 1996 
were marked by hectic activity.  Enron’s volume of business operations, 
assets, and share prices all rose to great heights in this short period, before 
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the dramatic collapse towards the end of 2001.26  The events in this period 
are examined here from the perspective of the three issues outlined above 
– namely, share prices and disclosures, corporate business freedom and the 
incentives offered to Enron management. 
 
A. SHARE PRICES AND DISCLOSURES 
 
We are informed by efficient market theorists that “actual prices of 
individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both 
on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the 
market expects to take place in the future.”27  This indicates that prices are 
based on two sets of data – corporate financial statements that provide 
information on “events that have already occurred,” and forecasts made by 
companies about their future prospects.  The forecasts would be an 
important input for the market to predict the events which it “expects to 
take place in the future.”  In recognition of these factors, regulation 
requires companies to submit reports on their past – namely, the financial 
statements,28 and forecasts for the future.29 
 
The years from 1996 onwards were, as noted earlier, eventful for Enron.  
The table below has the business data and share prices of Enron in the 
period 1996-2000.30  In October 2001, Enron revised its business results 
for these years, and they are considered a little later. 
 
                                                 
26 For a comprehensive account of the business practices of Enron, its efforts to influence 
energy regulation and the factors and developments that caused the subsequent fall of 
Enron, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: The Seeds of Destruction (London: 
Allen Lane/Penguin, 2003). 
27 Eugene Fama, Note 25, above. 
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13. 
29 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Regulation S-B, 17 CFR Part 228, Item 
303. 
30 Data taken from Enron annual reports in Form 10-K, filed with Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  The reports for each fiscal year are filed after the end of the 
year, in the early part of the next year.  Available online: www.sec.gov, under “Company 
Filings,” CIK “0001024401.”  For 1996, see under CIK “0000072859.” May 2007. 
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Table 1 
 
Enron Corp. 
Business Data and Share Prices 1996-2000 – An Analysis 
 
Description 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Earnings on 
Common 
Stock 
($ Million) 
 
568 
 
88 
 
686 
 
827 
 
896 
Earnings Per 
Share ($) 
2.31 0.32 2.14 2.34* 2.44*      
Dividend Per 
Share ($) 
0.86 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.00 
Price Range 
per Share ($) 
35 – 48 
 
35 – 45 38 – 59 29 – 90* 42 – 182* 
Dividend as 
% of Peak 
Share Price 
 
2.45% 
 
2.02% 
 
1.62% 
 
1.11% 
 
0.55% 
Outstanding 
Common 
Shares 
(Million) 
 
251 
 
307 
 
331 
 
358* 
 
376 
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
($ Million) 
 
3,723 
 
5,618 
 
7,048 
 
9,570 
 
11,470 
Market 
Capitalization 
at Peak Share 
Price  
($ Million) 
 
 
8,785 
 
 
13,815 
 
 
19,529 
 
 
32,220 
 
 
68,432 
Earnings as 
% of Market 
Capitalization 
 
6.46% 
 
0.64% 
 
3.51% 
 
2.57% 
 
1.31% 
 
* Enron made a two-for-one stock split in August 1999.  The figures for 
1999 and 2000 in the Table are adjusted for the stock split. 
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The growth in the earnings on common stock and other fundamentals 
during the five-year period was consistent, except for a setback in 1997.  
There were hardly any dramatic improvements in the business 
fundamentals of Enron during the five-year period in which peak share 
prices, adjusted for the split rose from $ 48 to $ 182.    We can interpret 
the business data and prices of Enron shares in the following terms, to 
assess the informational efficiency of prices in the stock market. 
 
• Price/earnings ratio, which interprets share prices in terms of the 
earnings of companies, is an important tool for evaluating 
investments, and it is supposed to influence the price determination 
in the market.  The earnings of Enron grew by about 57 percent 
during the five years, but the increase in peak share price was 404 
percent in the same period.31 
 
• Price/dividend ratio measures the price of shares in terms of the 
dividend paid by companies, and is another tool for determining 
the investment value of shares.  The dividend paid by Enron on its 
common shares during 1996-2000 was, by no means, impressive, 
and the price/dividend ratio showed consistent decline, from 2.45 
percent in 1996 to 0.55 percent in 2000.  The dividends paid by 
Enron, therefore, hardly offered an attractive or even a reasonable 
rate of return 
 
• Shareholders equity, which grew from $ 3,723 million to $ 11,470 
million, saw an increase of 308 percent.  This is closer to the 
increase of 404 percent in the share prices, although there is a 
sizable gap between the increase in share price and shareholders’ 
equity. 
 
• We cannot also overlook the two-for-one stock split made by 
Enron in August 1999.  The trend of increase in share prices 
prompted the stock-split, which was obviously intended to sustain 
                                                 
31 The pattern of changes in the minimum trading prices during the period was erratic.  
From 35 dollars in 1996, it fell to 29 dollars in 1999 but recovered to 42 dollars in 2000.  
But the trend with peak prices was consistent increase.  They are more relevant for our 
analysis here because Enron was, at that time, considered a good investment opportunity, 
and its shares were a popular choice for investment. 
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the trend.  The effort was successful as the peak price, adjusted for 
the split, more than doubled in the next year.. 
 
It is difficult to justify the market valuations of Enron shares by the 
conventional standards, such as return on investment and underlying 
value.  But then, Efficient Markets Hypothesis is not merely a number-
crunching exercise with the financial data of past periods.  Efficient 
market theorists emphasize that the share prices reflect not only the 
information “on events that have already occurred,” but also “events, 
which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future.”32  The 
forecasts presented by Enron were generally positive, and the company 
presented a picture of continuous growth.  The following extracts from its 
statutory annual reports are its official statements about the future.  The 
extracts are rather lengthy, but they are quite necessary for our analysis. 
1. FORECASTS FOR 1997 
 
Enron provided forecasts for six groups of activities in 199733 
 
Transportation and Operation 
 
The transportation and operation segment should continue to 
provide stable earnings and cash flows during 1997.  Various 
expansion projects underway or proposed by the Enron Gas 
Pipeline Group should enhance future earnings when completed. 
 
Domestic Gas and Power Services 
 
During 1997, ECT anticipates continued growth in the cash and 
physical business over the 1996 results.  The existence of its 
substantial portfolio of contracts as well as the ability to benefit 
from the relationships between the financial and physical markets 
and the natural gas and electricity markets provide substantial 
opportunities for earnings.  Continued seasonal volatility of natural 
                                                 
32 Eugene Fama, Note 25, above. 
33 Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1996.  Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 39-50, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72859/0000072859-97-000009.txt, May 2007. 
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gas prices will provide additional opportunities for increased 
earnings. 
 
Risk Management 
 
[Enron] expects earnings from risk management to increase in 
1997 as compared to 1996 as it continues to pursue opportunities in 
the European marketplace and continues to increase integration of 
financial products and its energy commodity portfolio, resulting in 
highly structured transactions. 
 
Finance 
 
In 1997, E[nron] will continue to expand its products and services 
in its role as a full-service provider of various types of capital.  In 
addition, earnings are expected from equity-based investments 
which are carried by JEDI at fair value and are therefore subject to 
market fluctuations. 
 
International Operations and Development 
 
The objective of E[nron] I[nternational] is to develop, finance, own 
and operate integrated energy projects in emerging markets 
through the utilization of Enron's extensive portfolio of products 
and services.  Growth opportunities in the emerging international 
markets are expected to result from the current and projected 
demand for energy infrastructure and merchant, finance and risk 
management services. 
 
Exploration and Production 
 
E[nron] O[il &] G[as Company] plans to continue to focus a 
substantial portion of its development and certain exploration 
expenditures in its major producing areas in North America.  
However, EOG anticipates spending an increasing part of its 
available funds in the further development of opportunities in 
India, Venezuela and Trinidad. In addition, EOG will continue 
limited exploratory expenditures in new areas outside of North 
America. 
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2. FORECASTS FOR 1998 
 
Enron classified its activities during 1998 into four categories, and the 
forecasts continued with their general tone of optimism and hope.34 
 
Exploration and Production 
 
E[nron] plans to continue its significant investments in 
development and certain exploration expenditures in its major 
producing areas in North America.  In addition, E[nron] anticipates 
increased spending for the continued development of its significant 
international projects in India, Venezuela, Trinidad and China.  
Enron has hedged its net exposure to E[nron]'s natural gas prices 
for 1998 production and will continue to assess opportunities for 
hedging future production. 
 
Transportation and Distribution 
 
Transportation and Distribution should continue to provide stable 
earnings and cash flows during 1998, including steady growth over 
1997 levels. 
 
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services 
 
Enron anticipates continued growth in Wholesale during 1998. 
Asset development and construction earnings are expected to 
increase as a result of Enron's extensive portfolio of projects in 
various stages of development.  In the cash and physical business, 
volumes are expected to continue to increase.  In addition, the 
existence of a substantial portfolio of contracts as well as the 
ability to benefit from the relationships between the financial and 
physical markets and the natural gas and electricity markets 
provide substantial opportunities for earnings.  Earnings from risk 
management are expected to increase as Enron continues to pursue 
opportunities in the European marketplace and continues to 
                                                 
34 Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1997.  Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 38-55, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-98-000009.txt, May 2007. 
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increase integration of financial products and its energy 
commodity portfolio worldwide.  In the finance and investing 
business, Enron will continue to expand its products and services 
in its role as a full-service provider of various types of capital.  
Further expansion into new products and international markets is 
expected to increase results in all of these businesses. 
 
Retail Energy Services 
 
During 1998, E[nron] E[nergy] S[ervices] will continue its focus 
on commercial and light industrial customers in the energy market, 
while developing new energy products and expanding its customer 
base.  EES also plans to continue its efforts to improve the 
regulatory environment for retail gas and electricity, both on state 
and federal levels,35 strengthen its marketing and sales organization 
and continue to enhance its transaction support capabilities. 
E[nron] E[nergy] S[ervices] expects that 1998 losses will 
approximate those incurred in 1997. 
 
Enron tempered its projections for 1998 with a note of caution on 
“Financial Risk Management,” and quantified the risk at $ 39 million. 
 
3. FORECASTS FOR 1999 
 
For 1999, Enron made its business projections under of four categories,36 
and among these, it was rather neutral, if not pessimistic, about the 
prospects of one – Exploration and Production.  Forecasts for the other 
three lines of business were optimistic in their usual bland style. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 The reference to the “efforts to improve the regulatory environment” is significant, as it 
indicates the political lobbying undertaken by Enron, and the inevitable corruption that 
accompanies such efforts. 
36 Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1998.  Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 38-58, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-99-000007.txt, May 2007. 
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Exploration and Production 
 
EOG plans to continue to focus a substantial portion of its 
development and exploration expenditures in its major producing 
areas in North America.  In addition, EOG anticipates additional 
spending for the continued development of its projects in India, 
Trinidad and China. 
 
In December 1998, Enron received an unsolicited indication of 
interest from a third party with respect to exploring a possible 
transaction pursuant to which the third party would acquire Enron's 
shares of EOG common stock and offer to acquire the remaining 
shares of outstanding EOG common stock.  There can be no 
assurance that any such transaction will be consummated. 
 
This cautious statement marks a departure from the usual tone of optimism 
and hope, and is uncharacteristic of Enron. 
 
Transportation and Distribution 
 
Transportation and Distribution should continue to provide stable 
earnings and cash flows during 1999, including steady growth over 
1998 levels. 
 
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services 
 
Enron anticipates continued growth in Enron Wholesale during 
1999 due to further expansion into new products and markets.  In 
the commodity sales and services business, volumes are expected 
to continue to increase as Enron maintains or increases its market 
share in the growing unregulated U.S. power market and the 
European gas and power markets.  In addition, Enron expects to 
benefit from opportunities related to its substantial portfolio of 
commodity contracts.  Enron also expects to continue increased 
integration of financial products with its energy commodity 
portfolio.  In the energy assets and investments business, Enron 
will continue to benefit from opportunities related to its energy 
investments, including sales or restructurings of appreciated 
investments, and in providing capital to energy-intensive 
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customers.  Equity earnings from operations are expected to 
increase as a result of commencement of commercial operations of 
new power plants and pipeline in early 1999 including the larger 
power project in India. 
 
Retail Energy Services 
 
During 1999, Enron anticipates continued growth in the demand 
for energy outsourcing solutions.  Energy Services will focus on 
delivering these services to its existing customers, while continuing 
to expand its commercial and industrial customer base for total 
energy outsourcing. Energy Services also plans to continue 
integrating its service delivery capabilities, focusing on the 
development of best practices, nation-wide procurement 
opportunities, efficient use of capital and centralized decision 
making. Energy Services expects reduced losses in 1999. 
 
Market Risk 
 
The use of financial instruments by Enron's businesses may expose 
Enron to market and credit risks resulting from adverse changes in 
commodity and equity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange 
rates. 
 
The theme of risk was present again in the forecasts for 1999.  After 
making the brief initial statement, extracted above, Enron classified 
market risks into four categories – commodity price, interest rate, foreign 
currency exchange rate, and equity – and described them at some length.  
But it did not quantify the value of the risks. 
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4. FORECASTS FOR 2000 
 
The number of business categories was five for 2000, but Enron presented 
forecasts only for four of them, all uniformly sunny.37  For the fifth line of 
business, Exploration and Production, about which Enron had been 
cautious in the earlier year, it made no forecasts. 
 
Transportation and Distribution 
 
The Gas Pipeline Group should continue to provide stable earnings 
and cash flows during 2000, including steady growth over 1999 
levels.  Low operating costs, competitive rates and continued 
expansion opportunities enable the Gas Pipeline Group to continue 
to be a strong, efficient competitor in all markets. 
 
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services 
 
Enron Wholesale plans to continue to expand its networks in each 
of its key energy markets, as well as the market for broadband 
services.  Worldwide energy markets continue to grow as 
governments implement deregulation or privatization plans.  The 
market for broadband services is expected to increase significantly 
as demand increases for high bandwidth applications such as 
video.  Enron will continue to purchase or develop selected assets 
to expand its networks, as well as grow its portfolio of contracts 
providing access to third-party assets.  The combination of 
growing markets and Enron Wholesale's highly developed market-
making skills should continue to enhance market opportunities 
globally for Enron over the next several years. 
 
As a result, Enron anticipates continued growth in Enron 
Wholesale during 2000.  In the commodity sales and services 
                                                 
37 Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1999.  Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 29-41, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-00-000002.txt, May 2007. 
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business, volumes are expected to continue to increase as Enron 
Wholesale increases its transaction volume in the growing 
unregulated U.S. power market and in the rapidly expanding 
European gas and power markets.  In addition, EnronOnline is 
expected to significantly add to transaction volume and profit 
opportunities in the coming year.  In the assets and investments 
business, Enron Wholesale expects to continue to benefit from 
opportunities related to its assets and investments, including sales 
or restructurings of appreciated investments, and in providing 
capital to energy-intensive customers.  Equity earnings from 
operations are expected to increase as a result of commencement of 
commercial operations of new power plants and pipeline projects 
in early 2000. 
 
Retail Energy Services 
 
During 2000, Energy Services anticipates continued growth in the 
demand for retail energy outsourcing solutions, both domestically 
and internationally.  Energy Services will deliver these services to 
its existing customers, while continuing to expand its commercial 
and industrial customer base for total energy outsourcing.  Energy 
Services also plans to continue integrating its service delivery 
capabilities, focusing on the development of best practices, 
nationwide procurement opportunities and efficient use of capital. 
 
5. FORECASTS FOR 2001 
 
The final set of forecasts made by Enron was for 2001, the last year before 
it filed for bankruptcy.38  Enron presented forecasts for four lines of 
business, but there was a new entrant – broadband.  In starting this new 
line of business, Enron was quite obviously inspired by the Internet boom 
in the stock market, and we discuss the issue in detail in Section [b], 
below.  Let us now take a look at the business forecasts made by Enron for 
2001. 
                                                 
38 Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 2000.  Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 28-43, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000102440101500010/0001024401-
01-500010.txt, May 2007. 
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Transportation and Distribution 
 
Enron Transportation Services is expected to provide stable 
earnings and cash flows during 2001.  The four major natural gas 
pipelines have strong competitive positions in their respective 
markets as a result of efficient operating practices, competitive 
rates and favorable market conditions.  Enron Transportation 
Services expects to continue to pursue demand-driven expansion 
opportunities. 
 
Wholesale Services 
 
In 2001, Wholesale Services plans to continue to fine-tune its 
already successful existing energy networks.  In North America, 
Enron expects to complete the sale of five of its peaking power 
plants located in the Midwest and its intrastate natural gas pipeline.  
In each case, market conditions, such as increased liquidity, have 
diminished the need to own physical assets.  For energy networks 
in other geographical areas where liquidity may be an issue, Enron 
will evaluate whether its existing network will benefit from 
additional physical assets.  The existing networks in North 
America and Europe should continue to provide opportunities for 
sustained volume growth and increased profits. 
 
The combination of knowledge gained in building networks in key 
energy markets and the application of new technology, such as 
EnronOnline, is expected to provide the basis to extend Wholesale 
Services' business model to new markets and industries.  In key 
international markets, where deregulation is underway, Enron 
plans to build energy networks by using the optimum combination 
of acquiring or constructing physical assets and securing 
contractual access to third party assets.  Enron also plans to 
replicate its business model to new industrial markets such as 
metals, pulp, paper and lumber, coal and steel.  Enron expects to 
use its Ecommerce platform, EnronOnline, to accelerate the 
penetration into these industries. 
 
 
  
24                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
 
 
Retail Energy Services 
 
During 2001, Energy Services anticipates continued growth in the 
demand for retail energy outsourcing solutions.  Energy Services 
will deliver these services to its existing customers, while 
continuing to expand its commercial and industrial customer base 
for total energy outsourcing.  Energy Services also plans to 
continue integrating its service delivery capabilities, extend its 
business model to related markets and offer new products. 
 
Broadband Services 
 
Broadband Services is extending Enron's proven business model to 
the communications industry.  In 2001, Enron expects to further 
develop the Enron Intelligent Network, a global broadband 
network with broad connectivity potential to both buyers and 
sellers of bandwidth through Enron's pooling points.  In addition, 
Enron expects to further deploy its proprietary Broadband 
Operating System across the Enron Intelligent Network, enabling 
Enron to manage bandwidth capacity independent of owning the 
underlying fiber.  Broadband Services expects its intermediation 
transaction level to increase significantly in 2001 as more market 
participants connect to the pooling points and transact with Enron 
to manage their bandwidth needs.  The availability of Enron's 
bandwidth intermediation products and prices on EnronOnline are 
expected to favorably impact the volume of transactions.  In 2001, 
Broadband Services expects to continue to expand the commercial 
roll-out of its content service offerings including video-on-demand.  
Enron expects the volume of content delivered over its network to 
increase as more content delivery contracts are signed and as more 
distribution partner locations are connected. 
 
The annual report in Form 10-K for 2000 also had a lengthy discussion on 
risk factors, but again it did not quantify the value of the risks anticipated 
for 2001. 
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In general, the forecasts made by Enron for the five years 1997-2001 were 
characterized by a sense of optimism and hope.  They gave little cause for 
concern.  Applying the broad principles of the informational regime and 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the action of the stock market in giving 
progressively higher valuations to the shares of Enron during this period 
cannot be faulted.  But the question raised here is with respect to the 
proportionality of increase or the sense of balance in market reaction, 
rather than the nature of the reaction or the quantum of increases.39 
 
As we noted earlier, the increase in peak share prices, at 404 percent, was 
out of proportion to the growth in earnings (57 percent), and the growth in 
shareholders’ equity (308 percent).  Also, the market appears to have 
almost completely ignored the cautions on risks sounded by Enron in its 
statutory filings.  These raise questions about the seriousness with which 
the stock market treats the statutory filings whose stated purpose is to 
guide the market.  The tone and spirit of the statements in the statutory 
filings, extracted above, were sober and sedate.  There were no attempts to 
sensationalizing, nor was eloquence applied to paint a very rosy picture for 
the company. 
 
The case was, however, quite different with the press releases issued by 
Enron during 1997-2001, particularly the ones issued in 2001 before the 
company filed for bankruptcy.  The press releases used more direct and 
aggressive language in projecting the company.  They were, quite 
obviously, intended to feed the stock market with stories of never-ending 
success and profits, and drive the price of Enron shares upwards. 
 
The following are some prominent examples of the variety of information 
Enron released to the media.40 
 
                                                 
39 It is not possible to attribute the increases in the price of Enron shares to the “Internet 
boom,” which gripped the stock market in the late 1990s.  Enron had little to do with the 
Internet, at least until 1999 when the company ventured into “broadband networks,” as 
we will see a little later. 
40 The complete list and texts of the press releases issued by Enron Corp. in 2001 are 
available online: http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/, May 2007. 
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• “Enron Announces Increased Earnings Target for 2001,” January 
25, 2001. 
• “Enron Reports Record First Quarter Earnings of $ 0.47 per 
Diluted Share; Increases Earnings Expectations for 2001,” April 
17, 2001. 
• “Enron Reiterates Confidence in Operations and Earnings 
Outlook,” June 19, 2001. 
 
These releases related to the profits and earnings of Enron’s business.  
Alongside, Enron issued a number of press releases that regularly extolled 
the other accomplishments of the company.  They had headlines like 
“Enron Named Most Innovative for Sixth Year” (June 2, 2001).41  The 
runaway increases in the price of Enron shares can be traced more to the 
tone and contents of the press releases and media reports, rather than the 
sober and balanced language of the statutory filings. 
 
The question here is which source of information received greater weight 
in the stock market?  Was it the press releases and media reports, or the 
statutory filings?  If the actual events in the market are inspired by 
corporate press releases, rather than the contents of statutory filings, then 
which of them is the source of the “information” stressed by the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis? What is the actual significance of the elaborate 
informational regime?  These questions are again articulated in the 
concluding section of the paper. 
 
B. ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS BY ENRON 
 
In October 2001, Enron restated its financial data for the years 1997 to 
2000.  This triggered a panic in the stock market, which led to a collapse 
in the price of its shares, and finally the company itself.  The following is a 
summary of the accounting revisions announced by Enron.42 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Data taken from the Report of Special Investigative Committee of the Board of 
Directors of Enron Corp. (William C. Powers Committee), February 1, 2002, available 
online: www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf, May 2007 
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Table 2 
 
Enron Corp. 
Impact of Accounting Restatements Announced in October 2001 
 
      (All figures in $ million) 
 
Year Earnings 
Original 
Earnings 
Revised 
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
Original 
Shareholders’  
Equity 
Revised 
1997 88 60 5,618 5,360 
1998 686 553 7,048 6,657 
1999 827 579 9,570 8,860 
2000 896 779 11,470 10,716 
Net 
Change 
 - 526   
 
The revised information was, admittedly, not available to the market at the 
time when the prices were determined in the market in the above years, 
and they are not relevant for our assessment of the informational 
efficiency of the market with respect to the contemporary prices set in the 
market.  But the revised data are relevant for what happened in the market 
after the revision. 
 
According to the doctrine of the informational regime and the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis, the market must have adjusted the prices of Enron 
shares in line with the revised data.  The total revision in earnings was to 
the tune of 21 percent, and in the case of shareholders’ equity, the revision 
was less than 7 percent.  Going by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, 
revision in the price of Enron shares must have been in the neighbourhood 
of these percentages.  But it was not so.  The market overreacted to the 
revisions, just as it had earlier overreacted to positive news from the 
company, and slaughtered Enron shares. 
 
The reaction of the stock market to information was excessive on both 
occasions, earlier when Enron projected a very rosy future, and later when 
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it revised its earnings figures.  The company did, after all, have its 
business and assets.  The liquidity problems which led to the bankruptcy 
filing in 2001 were a passing phase, and there were no grounds to believe 
that the case was hopeless.  The business of the company – namely, selling 
energy, was fundamentally sound.  That the market perception about the 
value of Enron was wrong is proved by the fact that it has made 
disbursements of over $ 11 billion since the bankruptcy filing until March 
2007.43 
 
C. ENRON, BROADBAND NETWORKS AND BUSINESS 
ADVENTURISM 
 
In 1999 at the height of the frenzy in the stock market in the shares of 
Internet companies, Enron ventured into broadband business.  Those were 
also the heady days of growth at Enron, and starting new ventures was the 
order of the day.  Enron, an energy company with 70 years’ standing, was 
apparently mesmerized by the spell of Internet technology, and decided to 
take the plunge.44  The following is an account of how Enron went about 
its broadband network venture. 
 
Under American corporate law, as it developed in early twentieth century, 
corporate managements have complete freedom to take up any business 
activity.  There are neither legal restrictions on their powers, nor even 
procedural safeguards.45  It would be obvious from the following 
discussion that Enron jumped into the broadband venture investing 
hundreds of millions of dollars, without serious planning.  The actions of 
                                                 
43 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (formerly Enron Corp.) Press Release “Enron 
Distributes Approximately $ 1.9 Billion to Creditors” 2 April 2007, available online: 
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/, May 2007. 
44 For an entertaining account of the Net Frenzy in the stock market in the 1990s, see 
William Bonner & Addison Wiggin, The Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft 
Depression of the 21st Century (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003). 
45 For an account of the position that existed earlier in the nineteenth century when the 
business activities of corporations were subject to regulation, and the gradual changes 
that occurred, see Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory” (1985) 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173. 
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Enron described here raise questions about the decision-making process in 
large public corporations, the level of responsibility that informs the 
process, and accountability of corporate actors for their decisions. 
 
The following table has the comparative data with respect to “capital 
expenditures and equity investments” of Enron for 1999.  Plans of capital 
expenditure were given in the annual report in Form 10-K for 1998 filed in 
1999, and the actual expenditures were given in the annual report for 1999 
filed in 2000. 
 
Table 3 
 
Enron Corp. 
Capital Expenditures and Equity Investments 
      (Figures in $ Million) 
 
Description  Estimates  
 
Actual 
Expenditure 
Difference 
Transportation 
and Distribution 
550 316 -234 
Wholesale 
Energy 
Operations and 
Services 
 
310 
 
1,216 
 
+906 
Retail Energy 
Services 
410 64 -346 
Exploration and 
Production 
40 226 +186 
Corporate and 
Other 
300 541 +241 
Total 1,610 2,363 +753 
 
 
It can be seen from the above table that there is no reference to any 
expenditure on broadband networks either in the plan figures reported in 
1998 or in the actual expenditure reported in 1999.  In particular, the 
absence of any reference in the estimates given as a part of the 1998 report 
indicates that Enron did not have any plans to venture into this new line of 
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business.  On closer scrutiny, we find that the new line of business, 
broadband network, is tucked away under “wholesale energy operations 
and services.”  The capital expenditure under this head ($ 1,216 million) 
was about four times the estimate ($ 310 million), but there is no 
explanation for the overrun.  In particular, there is no information on the 
expenditure incurred on the broadband network.  Given the size of the 
overrun and the fact that a new venture – broadband network – was taken 
up during the year, it is reasonable to assume that the expenditure on the 
new venture was to the tune of several hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
Against this background, disclosures made in the annual report for fiscal 
year 1999, the year in which the investment was actually made, are 
revealing.46 
 
• In the discussion of “Business” in Part 1 of the report, there is a 
rather abrupt reference to “communication assets including 
broadband services,” and they are included in “Wholesale Energy 
Operations and Services.”  No efforts are made to introduce the 
fact that the company had entered the broadband business.47 
 
• The next reference to “broadband services business” has the prefix 
“new,” and this is the only indication that it represents a new line 
of business for the company.48 
 
• The report then has six paragraphs which generally extol the 
advantages of the “Enron Intelligent Network ("EIN"), a high 
capacity, global fiber optic network with a distributed server 
architecture, to provide services to the broadband market.”49 
 
• The lengthy discussion makes no efforts to identify how and by 
whom the decision to enter the broadband business was taken, nor 
does it disclose the amount of investment. 
                                                 
46 Note 37, above. 
47 Ibid. at p. 1. 
48 Ibid. at p. 5. 
49 Ibid. at p. 11. 
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• The only references to the individuals involved in the new 
broadband venture are in the designations of Joseph M. Hirko, who 
is described as the “CEO of Enron Broadband Services,” and 
Kenneth D. Rice, who is also described as “CEO of Enron 
Broadband Services.”50 
 
• In the discussion of “Outlook” for 2000, as we have noted above, 
the report was quite eloquent about the potential of the broadband 
business.51 
 
From the above, we can reasonably conclude that (a) the broadband 
network business was started rather suddenly in 1999, and (b) its cost ran 
into many hundreds of millions of dollars.  The company folded up in the 
next two years, and the fate of the broadband network is not known.  The 
variety of reporting done by Enron is also significant.  It did not disclose 
the expenditure incurred by it on the new venture, the broadband network, 
nor did it discuss the venture in an intelligible manner. 
 
The wide variance between the capital expenditure plans for 1999 
disclosed in annual report for 1998 filed at the beginning of 1999 and the 
actual expenditure reported for 1999 indicate that Enron management had 
little respect for its own estimates.  It casually overshot the estimates, and 
the total overrun was more than $ 750 million.  Neither corporate law, nor 
the informational regime has anything to say on such conduct.  On the 
contrary, the defense of business judgment accepted by the courts would 
prevent them from examining such managerial decisions and actions, if 
they were to be questioned in court.52 
 
In terms of corporate accountability, the fact that Enron management 
could rush into such decisions and expend very large sums of (other 
peoples’) money is a commentary on the way public corporations are 
                                                 
50 Ibid. at p. 20-21. 
51 P. 18, above. 
52 For a general critique of the business judgment rule, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
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presently organized under the law.  The cursory discussion made by Enron 
management with respect to the new business, ex post, is an indication of 
the efficacy of the informational regime.  The company did not have to 
disclose the amount of money invested in the new business, the 
considerations which went into the decision or the identity of the 
individuals involved in the decision.  The barebones disclosures actually 
made by Enron are sufficient compliance with regulation, but they are 
virtually useless in terms of promoting corporate responsibility or 
accountability. 
 
The broadband venture of Enron was more in the spirit of Adam Smith’s 
“speculative merchant” who 
 
[e]xercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of 
business.  He is a corn merchant this year, or tea merchant the year 
after.  He enters into every trade when he foresees that it is likely 
to be more than commonly profitable . . .53 
 
The criticisms leveled above can be countered with the argument, what if 
the broadband network investment had paid off?  The question smacks of 
a gambling and speculative approach to business managed by a few for the 
benefit of many, and reinforces the earlier criticism about weak corporate 
responsibility and accountability.  The amount of money in question was 
very large, and was not that of the persons who handled it.  The decisions 
made by this handful of individuals would have serious consequences for 
many others, and it is imperative that a sense of responsibility informs the 
conduct of the persons in such positions of power.  The freedom that 
business corporations are given in law, exemplified by consequences such 
as the broadband business venture of Enron, must also be examined from 
these perspectives. 
 
Enron’s annual report for the next year (2000)54 is eloquent about the 
business advantages which Enron expected to derive from the broadband 
                                                 
53 Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 1, 
Chapter 10, Part 1. Available online: http://geolib.com/smith.adam/won1-10.html, June 
2007. 
54 Note 38, above. 
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business.  However, it actually lost $ 60 million in 2000 from the 
broadband business.  According to the annual report for 2000, Enron 
expected to incur further capital expenditure of $ 436 million on its 
broadband network in 2000, and another $ 700 million in 2001. 
 
The argument here is that the high valuations offered by the stock market 
for the shares of technology companies in the late 1990s was the incentive 
for Enron to venture into broadband business, and the above is a brief tale 
of how it went about the venture.  It is not that business enterprises must 
have no flexibility, but it is important that we combine it with adequate 
safeguards which would guide managements towards responsible 
decision-making, and promote accountability. 
 
D. ENRON MANAGEMENT AND ITS INCENTIVES FOR 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The managerial style at Enron became increasingly stock market-centric in 
the final years, and this is exemplified by the performance incentives 
offered to its senior management.  Here, we examine the employment 
contracts of its CEO, Kenneth Lay, and his last two contracts with the 
company explain how stock market considerations emerged as the sole 
concern at Enron in its last years..  The incentives offered to Kenneth Lay 
were primarily geared towards achieving increases in share prices; 
improving business performance was only secondary. 
 
Kenneth Lay had an employment agreement dated September 1, 1989 and 
there was a fifth amendment to the agreement in February 1994.55  By this 
amendment, Kenneth Lay had the option to acquire 1.2 million shares of 
Enron at the then prevailing market price of $ 34.  The right to exercise the 
options was linked to Enron achieving 15 percent compounded growth in 
earnings per share in 1994, 1995 and 1996.  This can be traced to the well-
known tendency of the stock market to give higher valuations to the shares 
                                                 
55 Text of the amendment is a part of the annual report of Enron in Form 10-K for 1993, 
available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72859/0000072859-94-
000005.txt, June 2007. 
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of companies that show growth in earnings.  This tendency of the stock 
market is well-known.56   
 
Faced with growth targets for earnings, Kenneth Lay was able to achieve 
growth right on target, as evident from the table below. 
 
Table 4 
 
Enron Corp. 
Earnings per Share Targets and Actual – 1994-96 
 
Year Earnings Per Share 
Target 
Actual Earnings Per 
Share 
1994 1.783 1.80 
1995 2.050 2.07 
1996 2.357 2.31 
 
The accuracy with which Enron achieved the growth in earnings per share 
is remarkable.  It raises questions about the quality of the financial 
statements of Enron for the relevant years (1994, 1995 and 1996), given its 
record of financial misstatements and restatements.  The fatal restatements 
announced by Enron in 2001 were with respect to 1997, 1998, 1999 and 
2000, but the closeness of the reported earnings for the earlier years with 
the respective targets is suspicious. 
 
In the Roaring Nineties,57 the use of stock options, and share price 
increases triggered by reported increases in earnings were both 
widespread.  The annual growth rate target of 15 percent determined by 
Enron was neither accidental, nor uncommon.  It was apparently the norm 
of the times.  Edward Chancellor explained: 
 
                                                 
56 The Conglomerate Boom of the 1960s, in which companies went on a spree of 
acquiring other companies with higher earnings, was an early symptom of this trend.  See 
George Soros, The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987). 
57 The phrase has been used by Joseph Stiglitz, note 26, above. 
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Equity-linked bonus schemes provide a clear incentive for 
managements to fix the numbers.  During the bubble period, the 
market tended to reward companies which managed to supply 
annual per-share earnings growth of 15% - a magic number 
chosen, it would seem, because it implied profits would double 
over five years.  In the real world, in a period of low inflation, this 
was an absurd target.  Nevertheless, it became commonplace.  
Earnings-growth targets were achieved through a number of ways.  
First, it became common to report to investors unofficial and 
unaudited earnings figures – known as “pro forma” – which 
ignored certain costs such as depreciation charges.  Second, growth 
in earnings per share was frequently boosted by taking on debt to 
repurchase shares.  Third, some companies looked to reduce 
normal business expenses, such as investment in research and 
development or marketing, in order to create the illusion of 
sustainable earnings growth.  Fourthly, many companies – such as 
the conglomerates General Electric and Tryco – bolstered their 
earnings by acquiring other companies, whose share were less 
highly-valued.58 
 
The saving grace with the 1994 amendment to the employment contract of 
Kenneth Lay was that it at least linked improving the business 
performance and earnings of the company to the incentive offered to Lay.  
It was not directly concerned with managing share prices in the stock 
market.  But these pretenses were dropped in the next employment 
contract of Lay, signed in December 1996.59 
 
Under the 1996 agreement, Kenneth Lay could get 637,500 shares of 
Enron on the condition that the price of Enron shares outperformed the 
Standard and Poor Composite Index.  This was to be the new yardstick for 
measuring the performance of Kenneth Lay.  The focus is entirely on share 
prices, and other considerations are irrelevant.  Everything is subordinated 
                                                 
58 Edward Chancellor, “Sold Out” The Guardian, 27 June 2002. 
59 The agreement is Exhibit 10.25 to the annual report in Form 10-K filed by Enron for 
fiscal year 1996, available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0000950129-97-001319.txt, June 2007. 
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to the supreme goal of managing increases in share prices, and all 
corporate actions must lead towards this goal. 
 
The actions of Enron during the fateful years, 1997-2001, can be better 
understood from the perspective of the incentives that were held out to its 
management, exemplified by the employment contract of Kenneth Lay.  
Excessive risk-taking, expensive efforts at influencing regulation through 
political and administrative corruption, unduly optimistic press releases, 
business losses and clumsy efforts to cover them up, all appear, in 
retrospect, inevitable, almost pre-ordained.  They were beckoning, and 
Enron and Lay had to only grasp them.60 
 
III. SYCAMORE NETWORKS 
 
Sycamore Networks is a representative of the technology companies 
which were started in large numbers during the Internet boom in the stock 
market in the late 1990s.  A theory was presented that the business value 
of these companies was in their cutting edge technology, and the potential 
for profits was huge, virtually limitless.61  By implication, conventional 
standards like physical assets and earnings would have little relevance for 
such companies.62  This was an important distinction because it eliminated 
arguments that the high prices which the market gave to the shares of 
Internet companies could not be justified with reference to conventional 
standards.  This was the milieu in which Sycamore Networks made its 
entry. 
 
                                                 
60 The end of Kenneth Lay, the son of a poor preacher, was fittingly melodramatic.  The 
trial court convicted him in May 2006 of various crimes, and he faced a long prison 
sentence.  But Lay died in less than two months, in July 2006 before his sentence was 
determined.  Significantly, the conviction of Kenneth Lay was vacated after his death, 
which means that his family would not be deprived of most of the wealth acquired by 
Lay. 
61 For an entertaining and irreverent account of the exaggerations made about technology 
companies during the period, see William Bonner and Addison Wiggin, note 44, above. 
62 For a discussion on such arguments, see Geoffrey Moore, “When private goes public” 
Forbes, 10 April 1999. 
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Sycamore Networks was incorporated in 1998, and quickly made two 
public issues – one in August 1999 and another in March 2000.  
Admittedly for neither of the two issues did it have any business needs for 
which it required capital.  The Delaware corporate statute places no 
restrictions on the right of corporations to issue their shares.63  It is not 
necessary that companies must have business need, or other legitimate 
reasons before they can issue their shares to the public.  They are free to 
offer their shares to the public, and the only consideration is that there are 
willing buyers for the shares offered. 
 
Neither does securities law require that companies must have business 
needs or other legitimate reasons for public issues.64  It is sufficient for the 
purpose of securities law if a company making a public issue discloses its 
plans on how it would use the proceeds of the issue, or alternatively, state 
that it has no plans! 
 
Neither corporate law nor securities law seek to regulate issues of shares 
by companies to the public.65  The matter is left to the all-wise market, 
which is considered to be sufficiently capable of handling such questions.  
There is no role for public policy, represented by the law, to intervene in 
such matters.  Sycamore Networks is a case-in-example of the possibilities 
in this loose regulatory framework. 
 
As we noted earlier, Sycamore Networks was incorporated in February 
1998, at the height of the Internet boom in the stock market.  It made two 
public issues, one in August 1999 and the other, a “follow-up” issue, in 
February 2000.  Both the public issues were made during the boom period, 
and the company and its management took full advantage of the prevailing 
sentiment in favour of technology companies.  The company collected 
over $ 1.5 billion from the two public issues, while insiders collected over 
$ 260 million from sale of the shares held by them.  We now examine how 
the company marketed its issues, and how it was received by the investors. 
                                                 
63 Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 151. 
64 On the contrary, they expressly permit companies having no specific need for capital, 
termed “blank check companies” to make public issues.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. 77a et seq. Section 3(b)(3) and Rule 419 (17 CFR Part 230). 
65 The issue of public issues and their legitimacy is discussed a little later. 
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A. SYCAMORE DISCLOSURES AND STOCK MARKET BEHAVIOUR 
 
The rationale of the informational regime is that the disclosures made by 
companies will put the investors on alert, and enable them to make 
informed investment decisions.66  The law does not seek to directly protect 
the investors, but merely requires companies to make disclosures.  The 
theory is that the investors, armed with knowledge, would be able to 
assess the quality of public issues and protect themselves by making 
appropriate investment decisions.  Among the disclosures which 
companies must make with respect to their public issues, “risk factors” are 
an important part.  Information about the risk factors is supposed to put the 
investors on guard, and help them to decide about their choice of 
investments. 
 
The other side of the informational regime is that once a company has 
made the necessary disclosures, it cannot be held responsible for the 
outcome of the investment decisions made by investors.  The reasoning is 
that if the investors have been alerted by the risk factors disclosed, and if 
the risks materialize later on, the corporation which had already issued a 
warning about the risk can hardly be held to task. 
 
Sycamore Networks, as we have noted, is a company formed during a 
particular tide in the stock market – the Internet boom – and it intended to 
take advantage of it.  The events in Sycamore are more intelligible when 
viewed from this perspective.  The first registration statement filed by 
Sycamore Networks under the Securities Act of 1933 began with the 
following caveat.67 
 
You should rely only on the information contained in this 
prospectus. We have not authorized anyone to provide you with 
information different from that contained in this prospectus.  
                                                 
66 P.M. Vasudev, note 20, above, at p. 35. 
67 Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, August 6, 1999, at p. 3. 
Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-99-
002819.txt, May 2007. 
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The caveat is significant because the company, like Enron, was in the 
practice of issuing frequent press releases, and it was also often written 
about in the financial press.  These reports generally projected the 
company in a favourable light, and the caveat was meant to shield the 
management against charges with respect to any information in the press 
releases or media reports.  The caveat was followed by a lengthy account 
of the “Risk Factors,”68 and it is necessary to extract the leading risk 
factors reported by the company, not despite but because of their length. 
 
• We Expect that Substantially All Of Our Revenues Will Be 
Generated From A Limited Number Of Customers.  We currently 
have only one customer, Williams Communications. Williams is 
not contractually committed to purchase any minimum quantities 
of products from us. 
• Our Business Is Difficult To Evaluate Because We Have A 
Limited Operating History. 
• Our Failure To Increase Our Revenues Would Prevent Us From 
Achieving And Maintaining Profitability 
• We have incurred significant losses since inception and expect to 
continue to incur losses in the future. 
• We Are Entirely Dependent On Our Line Of Intelligent Optical 
Networking Products And Our Future Revenue Depends On Their 
Commercial Success. 
• Our future growth depends on the commercial success of our line 
of intelligent optical networking products. To date, our SN 6000 
Intelligent Optical Transport product is the only product that has 
been shipped to a customer. 
• We intend to develop and introduce new products and 
enhancements to existing products in the future. We cannot assure 
you that we will be successful in completing the development or 
introduction of these products. Failure of our current or planned 
products to operate as expected could delay or prevent their 
adoption. 
                                                 
68 Ibid. at p. 6-16.  The extracts here are mostly bare headings.  For detailed warnings, see 
the document itself. 
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• Because Our Products Are Complex And Are Deployed In 
Complex Environments, They May Have Errors Or Defects That 
We Find Only After Full Deployment, Which Could Seriously 
Harm Our Business.  
• The market for intelligent optical networking products is new. We 
cannot be certain that a viable market for our products will develop 
or be sustainable. 
• Our Business Will Suffer If We Do Not Respond Rapidly To 
Technological Changes. 
• Our Business Will Suffer If Our Products Do Not Anticipate And 
Meet Specific Customer Requirements. 
• We Face Intense Competition.69 
• Our Business Will Suffer If We Do Not Expand Our Sales 
Organization And Our Customer Service And Support Operations. 
• We Depend Upon Contract Manufacturers And Any Disruption In 
These Relationships May Cause Us To Fail To Meet The Demands 
Of Our Customers And Damage Our Customer Relationships. 
• We Rely On Single Sources For Supply Of Certain Components 
And Our Business May Be Seriously Harmed If Our Supply Of 
Any Of These Components Is Disrupted. 
• The Unpredictability Of Our Quarterly Results May Adversely 
Affect The Trading Price Of Our Common Stock. 
• You should not rely on our results or growth for one quarter as any 
indication of our future performance. 
• Undetected Software Or Hardware Errors And Problems Arising 
From Use Of Our Products In Conjunction With Other Vendors' 
Products Could Have A Material Adverse Effect On Us. 
• Our Failure To Establish And Maintain Key Customer 
Relationships May Result In Delays In Introducing New Products 
Or Cause Customers To Forego Purchasing Our Products. 
• Our Business Will Suffer If We Fail To Properly Manage Our 
Growth. 
• We Depend On Our Key Personnel To Manage Our Business 
Effectively In A Rapidly Changing Market And If We Are Unable 
                                                 
69 This contradicted the earlier statement, at p. 2, about the significant innovative features 
of the product of Sycamore Networks and its unique advantages. 
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To Retain Our Key Employees, Our Ability To Compete Could Be 
Harmed. 
• Our Business Will Be Adversely Affected If We Are Unable To 
Protect Our Intellectual Property Rights From Third-Party 
Challenges. 
• If Necessary Licenses Of Third-Party Technology Are Not 
Available To Us Or Are Very Expensive Our Business Will Be 
Seriously Harmed. 
• We Could Become Subject To Litigation Regarding Intellectual 
Property Rights Which Could Seriously Harm Our Business. 
• We May Face Risks Associated With Our International Expansion 
That Could Seriously Harm Our Financial Condition And Results 
Of Operations. 
• We Face A Number Of Unknown Risks Associated With Year 
2000 Problems.70 
• Any Acquisitions We Make Could Disrupt Our Business And 
Seriously Harm Our Financial Condition. 
• Our Stock Price May Be Volatile. 
• Management May Apply The Proceeds Of This Offering To Uses 
That Do Not Increase Our Profits Or Market Value.71 
• Insiders Will Continue To Have Substantial Control Over 
Sycamore After This Offering And Could Limit Your Ability To 
Influence The Outcome Of Key Transactions, Including Changes 
of Control. 
• Provisions Of Our Charter Documents And Delaware Law May 
Have Anti-Takeover Effects That Could Prevent A Change Of 
Control. 
• Provisions of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation, 
bylaws, and Delaware law could make it more difficult for a third 
party to acquire us, even if doing so would be beneficial to our 
stockholders. 
                                                 
70 This is a rather strange statement from a company that has hardly commenced 
operations, and must be in a position to take effective steps to handle the perceived risks 
from the Year 2000 phenomenon. 
71 This comes perilously close to admission of criminal intentions on the part of the 
management. 
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• There May Be Sales Of A Substantial Amount Of Our Common 
Stock After This Offering That Could Cause Our Stock Price To 
Fall. 
• Our current stockholders hold a substantial number of shares, 
which they will be able to sell in the public market in the near 
future. Sales of a substantial number of shares of our common 
stock within a short period of time after this offering could cause 
our stock price to fall. In addition, the sale of these shares could 
impair our ability to raise capital through the sale of additional 
stock. 
 
These dire warnings left nothing to chance.  The authors of the document 
were, however, still not satisfied, and invoke the so-called “safe-harbour” 
in the Securities Laws for further protection.72  They add: 
 
We believe that it is important to communicate our future 
expectations to our investors. However, there may be events in the 
future that we are not able to accurately predict or control. The 
factors listed above in the section captioned “Risk Factors,” as well 
as any cautionary language in this prospectus, provide examples of 
risks, uncertainties and events that may cause our actual results to 
differ materially from the expectations we describe in our forward-
looking statements. Before you invest in our common stock, you 
should be aware that the occurrence of the events described in 
these risk factors and elsewhere in this prospectus could have a 
material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and 
financial position.73 
 
Quite obviously, the registration statement has been prepared with a great 
deal of care to ensure that the management of Sycamore would be 
adequately protected if there were any allegations about the public issue 
and the prospects of the company.  This is a neat subversion of the 
principle of disclosure which is the foundation of the informational 
regime.  The disclosures required in law are meant to inform the investors, 
rather than to protect the persons who issue the securities.  The case of 
                                                 
72 Securities Act, Section 27A. 
73 Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, note 67, above at p. 16. 
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Sycamore is an illustration of how an apparently well-conceived 
regulatory instrument can be abused. 
 
Subsequently in the discussion on “Business,” later in the document,74 
Sycamore Networks portrayed its product and business prospects in a 
somewhat positive light, but was careful to add some references to the 
uncertainty created by factors such as the “intensely competitive market”75 
and the possibility of “claims [of] infringement with respect to our current 
or future products.”76  This is yet another example of clever legal drafting.  
A registration statement for securities, or to use the traditional term, 
“prospectus,”77 cannot completely avoid any favourable description of the 
business of the company which plans to issue the securities.  At the same 
time, the promoters would be at risk if the descriptions are very rosy and 
optimistic.  Therefore, clever efforts are made to blend optimism with 
uncertainty. 
 
1. PURPOSE OF FIRST PUBLIC ISSUE 
 
After making dark predictions about the future, Sycamore explained the 
purposes for which it planned to make the public issue. 
 
The principal purposes of this offering are to establish a public 
market for our common stock, to increase our visibility in the 
marketplace, to facilitate future access to public capital markets, to 
provide liquidity to existing stockholders and to obtain additional 
working capital. 
 
We expect to use the net proceeds for general corporate purposes, 
including working capital and capital expenditures, and the 
                                                 
74 Ibid. at p. 25-34. 
75 Ibid. at p. 33. 
76 Ibid. at p. 34. 
77 The older term “prospectus,” derived from the word “prospect,” was etymologically 
more accurate.  A statement issued in connection with the issue of securities would 
describe the “prospects” of the project that was planned with the money to be raised from 
the issue.  The current term “registration statement” is largely neutral in its import, and 
can be interpreted as a sign of a more “hands-off” approach in securities regulations. 
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repayment of outstanding amounts under our equipment lines of 
credit. . .  
 
Although we may use a portion of the net proceeds to acquire 
businesses, products or technologies that are complementary to our 
business, we have no specific acquisitions planned. Pending such 
uses, we plan to invest the net proceeds in investment grade, 
interest-bearing securities.78 
 
The public issue of shares was, quite obviously, treated an end itself, 
rather than as means to the end of raising capital for substantive business 
activities.79  The securities law makes no efforts to check this variety of 
public issues made for no clear business purpose.80  In any case, Sycamore 
Networks was candid that a purpose of the public issue was to “provide 
liquidity to existing stockholders.”  This takes us to the question of the 
track record of the “existing stockholders” and what they brought to the 
table at the time of the public issue, in terms of the business fundamentals 
of the company.  Sycamore Networks presented the following financial 
data for the period until May 1999, prior to its first public issue in August 
1999. 
 
Table 5 
 
Sycamore Networks 
Financial Data as on May 31, 1999 
                                                 
78 Sycamore Networks Registration Statement, note 67, above at p. 17. 
79 This neatly ties in with the portrayal of companies by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel (note 7, above at p. 1419-1420) as the sellers of securities, rather than entities 
raising capital for doing business.  In the imagery of Easterbrook and Fischel, the 
business of companies is selling securities.  The problem with this approach is not that it 
lacks truth, but it presents the situation as the ideal, a sort of perfect culmination of a 
process of rational development. 
80 This raises the larger question of a theory for the stock market, in terms of defining the 
role that we expect the institution to play in the socio-economy.  Historically, the role of 
the stock market has varied from providing capital for legitimate business purposes at one 
end, to being a veritable gambling den at the other.  The prevailing notions about the 
stock market affirm the need for a more comprehensive theory of the market, which is 
explored in the concluding part of this paper. 
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Description Amount ( $ ‘000s) 
Operating revenue -- 
Operating Expenses 11,384 
Accumulated operating loss (11,384) 
Shareholders’ equity (10,113) 
 
The company had no sales, and accumulated operating loss was over $ 11 
million.  The investors, for their part, were hardly deterred; neither the 
gloomy predictions made by the company, nor the absence of a well-
defined business purpose for the issue, nor even the poor financial record 
of the company made the slightest difference.  Sycamore’s first public 
issue was completed in October 1999, and it was a resounding success.  
The company issued 7,475,000 common shares with a par value of $ 0.001 
at a price of $ 38 per share.81  The gross proceeds from the issue were $ 
284.5 million.  After deducting the expenses of about 21 million dollars 
incurred towards issue expenses, the company was left with 263 million 
dollars from the first public issue. 
 
On listing, Sycamore shares were received in the stock market with even 
greater enthusiasm, and were actively traded in the months that followed.  
The price reached $ 105 by the end of January 2000.  The company did 
not lose the opportunity presented by the enthusiasm of the market for its 
shares, and opened a “follow-up public offering” in February 2000.82  It 
completed the second issue in March 2000, at a price of $ 150.25 per 
share.  This time around, however, there was a difference.  Of the total of 
10.2 million shares offloaded to the public, about 8.43 million were issued 
by the company, and the remaining 1.77 million shares were sold 
personally by the existing holders, who were the management team and its 
                                                 
81 Sycamore Networks, report for the quarter ended October 31, 1999 in Form 10-Q, at p. 
8.  Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-99-
003928.txt, May 2007. 
82 Sycamore Networks, report for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 in Form 10-Q, at p. 
8.  Available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000092701600002132/0000927016-
00-002132.txt, May 2007. 
  
46                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
associates.83  The details of the two public issues of Sycamore Networks 
are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 6 
 
Sycamore Networks 
Public Issues of Shares 1999-2000 
 
Description First Issue 
(August-October 
1999) 
Second Issue 
(February-March 2000) 
Issue Price  $ 38 $ 150.25 
Number of shares 
issued by the company 
7,475,000* 
 
8,428,401 
Number of shares sold 
by management and 
associates 
- 1,771,599 
Gross Proceeds for the 
company 
$ 284,050,000 $ 1,266,367,250 
Gross Proceeds for the 
management and 
associates 
- $ 266,182,750 
Expenses of the Issue $ 21 million approx. $ 66 million approx. 
 
* The company effected a three-for-one stock split in February 2000,84 
before the second public issue, and consequently, the number of shares 
swelled to 22,425,000. 
 
2. SYCAMORE REPORTS AND SHARE PRICES 
 
To recapitulate, the theory of the informational regime and the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis is that the stock market will apply the information 
provided by the companies and determine share prices which reasonably 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. at p. 22. 
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reflect the “intrinsic value” of the shares.  As we have seen, Sycamore, a 
loss-making company, issued its shares at $ 38 in October 1999, and the 
price rose to $ 105 dollars by January 2000.  The second public issue made 
during March 2000 was at $ 150 per share. 
 
We have also seen that the issue price of 38 dollars per share, determined 
by the market in October 1999, could not be justified with reference to its 
business fundamentals, such as assets or earnings.  The dismal financial 
record of Sycamore and even more, the dark predictions it made about its 
future left little hope.  But the market ignored the information, and offered 
a price of $ 38 per share in October 1999. 
 
Let us now consider the events in the market over the next few months 
when the price of Sycamore shares reached $ 105 by January 2000, and 
for the second public issue made in February 2000, the market determined 
a price of $ 150 per share.  Following are the data for the six months ended 
January 2000, taken from the registration statement filed by Sycamore on 
February 17, 2002 before its second public issue.85  
 
Table 7 
 
Sycamore Networks Inc. 
Operating Results for Six Months ended January 29, 2000 
 
Description $ 000’s 
Revenues 48,559 
Cost of revenues and operating 
expenses 
60,415 
Loss from operations (11,856) 
 
In the eight months since May 1999 (see Table 6, above), Sycamore had 
indeed earned revenues, which were more than $ 48 million.  But it 
incurred expenses of over $ 60 million to earn this revenue, resulting in an 
operating loss of almost $ 12 million.  But the market did not pay much 
                                                 
85 Sycamore Netwoks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, February 17, 2000, at p. 20.  
Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-00-
000627.txt, May 2007. 
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attention to these facts, and continued with runaway increases in the price 
of Sycamore shares. 
 
3. DISCLOSURES FOR SYCAMORE’S SECOND PUBLIC ISSUE – FEBRUARY 2000 
 
We can now take a look at the disclosures in the registration statement 
filed by Sycamore for its second public issue made in February-March 
2000.  As the data in Table 7 above show, the company incurred a loss of 
almost $ 12 million from its operations during the six months ended 
January 29, 2000.  A reasonable and responsible management would 
attempt to explain or justify the increase expenses during the period and 
the resulting loss.  Sycamore, however, made no efforts at any explanation 
or justification.  This is an indication of the low degree of responsibility 
that informed the management of Sycamore and complacence about the 
success of its second public issue despite the loss. 
 
The description of “Risk Factors” in the second registration statement86 is 
in the same vein as the first one.87  The risks are described at length and in 
detail, bordering on relish.  This is, again, clearly intended to protect the 
management against any possible legal claims in the future regarding the 
company and its prospects.  The stated purposes of the second public 
issue, extracted below, are also no different from those of the first. 
 
The principal purposes of this offering are to obtain additional 
working capital, create a larger public float for our common stock, 
facilitate our future access to public capital markets and allow for 
the orderly liquidation of a portion of the investments made by 
certain of our stockholders. 
 
We expect to use the net proceeds from the sale of shares of 
common stock offered by us for general corporate purposes, 
including for working capital and capital expenditures, and to 
expand our sales and marketing operations, broaden our customer 
support capabilities, develop new distribution channels and fund 
research and development. We may use a portion of the net 
                                                 
86 Ibid. at p. 6-16. 
87 Note 67, above. 
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proceeds to acquire businesses, products or technologies that we 
believe will complement our current or future business. However, 
we have no specific acquisitions currently planned. We will retain 
broad discretion in the allocation of the net proceeds of this 
offering. Pending such uses, we plan to invest the net proceeds in 
investment grade, interest-bearing securities.88 
 
As at January 29, 2000, the period for which Sycamore provided financial 
data before its second public issue, the company had “cash, cash 
equivalents and marketable securities” totaling over $ 288 million, which 
were mostly the proceeds from the first public issue.  There is no reference 
in the registration statement to any specific plan for the use of this large 
amount of money.  It is, therefore, difficult to see why Sycamore needed 
more money for “general corporate purposes.”  On the contrary, the 
statement about “orderly liquidation” of investments by existing 
stockholders is the clue to the real reason for the second issue. 
 
Again, the market was hardly concerned either with the losses incurred by 
Sycamore Networks, its pessimism about its future, or the fact that it was 
approaching the market for a second time in seven months without any 
serious business plans.  On the contrary, the market increased the 
valuation of the company almost four-fold, and offered more than $ 150 
for the shares this time around. 
 
If we have understood the efficient market theorists correctly, the “profit-
maximizers” in the market would ensure that “actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events 
that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market 
expects to take place in the future.”89  It is not clear how the theory can 
explain the almost four-fold increase in the price of Sycamore shares in a 
span of seven months, a period of time when the company reported 
worsening financials and continued to be pessimistic about its future. 
 
To this question, the efficient market theorists might retort that the market 
was then in a boom phase.  But we have not been told that the Efficient 
                                                 
88 Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, note 85, above at p. 17. 
89 Eugene Fama, note 25, above. 
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Markets Hypothesis would be suspended during times of boom or bust in 
the market.  On the contrary, it is asserted that the market prices would, at 
“any point in time,” conform to the tenets of the Hypothesis.90 
 
4. SYCAMORE AND ITS DISCLOSURES – THE TWO FACETS 
 
In the case of Enron, we made a brief comparison between the sober and 
balanced tone of the statements made by it in its statutory filings and the 
bubbling enthusiasm and optimism that characterized its press releases.  A 
greater dichotomy is seen in the case of Sycamore Networks.  We have 
just recounted the pessimism and hopelessness which characterized the 
disclosures made by Sycamore in its statutory filings.  The company was, 
however, simultaneously issuing a number of press releases, which were 
completely different in their tone and content.91  They proudly announced 
the various accomplishments of the company, bristled with optimism, and 
painted a rosy future. 
 
The press releases issued by Sycamore Networks during 1999 and 2000, 
which were the heydays for the company’s shares, were singular for their 
optimism and buoyancy.  A few samples are given below, and they convey 
the dominant mood in the run-up to the first public issue in August 1999. 
 
Table 8 
 
Sycamore Networks 
Sample Press Releases: 1998-99 
 
12/09/1998 Sycamore Networks Named One Of The Top 25 Startups For 1998 
                                                 
90 What is remarkable about new-fangled theories like the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is 
not their content, which is bad enough.  Rather, it is the fact that we have to put in so 
much effort and argue eloquently against these absurd theories flipped at us casually by 
scholars with a variety of agendas and representing special interests.  It is quite 
despairing, but public interest demands that such efforts are countered with energy and 
determination, lest policy-making continue in the hands of special interests as has been 
the case in the last almost three decades. 
91 Complete texts of the press releases issued by Sycamore Networks available online: 
http://www.sycamorenet.com/corporate/news/index.asp?id=pressreleases&prType=archi
ve, May 2007. 
2008] STOCK MARKETS, CORPORATIONS & THEIR REGULATION 51 
 
 
 
03/08/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces Major Customer Commitment By 
Williams Communications92 
03/08/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces First Phase Of Intelligent Optical 
Networking Strategy 
05/12/1999 Upside Magazine Names Sycamore Networks Among 1999 Hot 100 
Private Companies 
05/17/1999 Sycamore Networks Named One of Top 100 By Red Herring 
Magazine 
05/24/1999 Sycamore Networks Selected By Millenium Optical Networks, 
Representing Another Major Customer Win 
06/07/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces The Industry's First End-To-End 
Optical Network Management System 
06/09/1999 Sycamore Networks Named Hot Startup By Telecommunications 
Magazine 
06/16/1999 Fortune Magazine Selects Sycamore Networks As One Of The 12 
Cool Companies For 1999 
 
The dichotomy between the statutory filings and other communications 
from companies, such as press releases, raise vital questions about the 
efficacy of the informational regime.  On the one hand, we have the 
statutory filings of companies in which companies make a set of 
disclosures and forecasts, which are, at best, guarded in their optimism.  
On the other, there are the press releases and media reports which are 
laudatory and buoyant, and they convey a different picture or image. 
 
It is tempting to discount the media reports with the specious argument 
that they are not put out by the companies, but most news reports are 
based on information provided by companies.  Companies release 
information to the media for specific purposes, mostly to present them in a 
good light and influence trade in their shares in the stock market.  In any 
case, the case with press releases issued by the companies is quite 
                                                 
92 The wording of this headline and the contents of the press release are quite different 
from the reference to William Communications in the risk factors narrated in the 
registration statement filed by Sycamore Networks in August 1999, discussed earlier. 
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different.  Companies are the authors of these materials, and there is no 
way we can sidestep their contents. 
 
We now have to contend with two sources of information about public 
corporations – statutory filings, and press releases and media reports.  
Obviously, the informational regime expects the market to be guided by 
the information in the statutory filings.  But the position of the efficient 
markets theorists on this issue – namely, whether the market is expected to 
derive its information from the statutory filings or other sources, is not 
clear.  They might argue that the market will apply all the available 
information, but the difficulty here is that the information is conflicting.  
Therefore, it would not be possible for the market to make rational 
decisions. 
 
The significance of the caveat entered by Sycamore that investors “should 
rely only on the information contained in this prospectus”93 lies in the 
dichotomy among different sources of information.  The company, in 
effect, warned the market to ignore other material, such as press releases 
issued by the company and media reports written about the company, in 
making investment decisions.  This is, however, not our main difficulty 
because various statutory provisions, which are discussed a little later, as 
well interpretations by the courts94 make it clear that all materials would 
be relevant in considering the question of fraud or deceit in public issues 
by companies. 
 
Rather, the difficulty with multiple sources and conflicting information 
about companies like Sycamore that their press releases are hardly untrue 
or factually inaccurate.  Therefore, they would not be “fraud” or “deceit” 
either under the securities law or the common law.  Let us now take a look 
at a few examples of statutory provisions intended to check fraud or deceit 
in public issues of securities by companies.95 
                                                 
93 Note 67, above. 
94 Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (U.K.), was an early case in which the standard 
of liability for company issuers was defined. 
95 For a commentary on the law on fraud in securities issues, see generally Louis Loss & 
Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen 
Publishers, 2004), Chapter 9. 
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• “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” (Section 17(a), 
Securities Act of 1933). 
 
• “obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (ibid.). 
 
• “any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser” (ibid.). 
 
• “make, regarding any security registered on a national securities 
exchange, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such 
security, any statement which was at the time and in the light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with 
respect to any material fact, and he knew or had reasonable ground 
to believe was so false or misleading” (Section 9(a)(4), Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
 
• “induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security . . 
. by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent 
device or contrivance” (Section 15(c)(1)(A), Securities Exchange 
Act). 
 
Quite obviously, it would be difficult to bring an action under any of these 
provisions with respect to the press releases of Sycamore.96  The caution 
sounded by Sycamore at the beginning of the registration statement is 
specifically intended to guard against such efforts.97  But it can hardly be 
disputed that the press releases contributed to the mood of euphoria in the 
                                                 
96 Actions were, however, brought against Sycamore Networks and investment bankers 
with respect to the public issues and their dealings in the shares, as we will see a little 
later.  The company has opted to make a settlement with the litigants, and has not 
defended itself against the charges. 
97 Here, we cannot also lose sight of the fact that the scheme of statutory provisions is 
designed for ex post remedy for the victims through contentious litigation.  Their 
effectiveness in preventing cases like Sycamore Networks is rather limited. 
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market and to the success of the two public issues of Sycamore.  They also 
encouraged active trade in Sycamore shares during the period.  The 
existing regulatory framework, which has disclosures as its underpinning, 
has no answer to such situations. 
 
The case of Sycamore illustrates the inadequacies of merely relying on 
disclosures.  This approach is perfunctory and simplistic.  Regulation 
mandates companies to make regular disclosures, and in particular, 
highlight the risk factors.  It assumes that investors, acting in a vacuum 
and without being influenced by any other factors, will be guided only by 
the statutory disclosures and arrive at rational decisions on the basis of the 
disclosures. 
 
5. ISSUE PRICE FOR SHARES – DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN 
INSIDERS AND THE PUBLIC 
 
We have earlier referred to the license available in law for corporations to 
determine the consideration payable for the issue of their shares.  
Sycamore Networks offers an effective demonstration of the practical 
implications of this license.  At the time of the first public issue in August 
1999, the company had about 5.44 million shares of the par value of $ 
0.001 outstanding, and its paid-in capital was $ 5.49 million.98  This 
indicates that each share was issued at a consideration of about $ 1, 
although it is not clear if the consideration was paid in cash.   Needless to 
add, all these shares were held by insiders. 
 
The company had also issued 15 million shares of its preferred stock to 
some private investors for a total consideration of $ 40.77 million.99  The 
average consideration for the preferred shares was, therefore, about $ 3 per 
share.  The funding provided by these investors, quite obviously, sustained 
the operations of the company in the early stages and in meeting the 
expenses of the public issue.   The 15 million preferred shares issued to 
private investors were converted three-fold into 47.28 million common 
                                                 
98 Sycamore registration statement, note 67, above at p. 18. 
99 Ibid. 
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shares on completion of the first public issue.100  The average cost of the 
resulting common shares in the hands of these private investors was, 
therefore, about $ 0.86. 
 
Sycamore made the first public issue at $ 38, and share price rose to $ 105 
by January 2000.  This meant exponential rises in the value of shares 
issued to the insiders and the private investors, acquired at $ 1 each or less.  
The deal was thus lucrative for all of them.  In addition, shares were also 
issued under the Employee Stock Option Plans of the company.101 
 
The insiders and their associates were apparently not satisfied with the 
windfall from the public listing of Sycamore shares.  Just before the 
second public issue, the company made a three-for-one stock split in 
February 2000.  This, of course, suited everyone; the insiders, their 
support group which had earlier acquired preferred shares, and the persons 
who had purchased the common shares in the public issue or in the market 
subsequently.  Everybody’s wealth tripled, just like that, and who could 
possibly object to that! 
 
By these processes, the number of outstanding common shares increased 
from a humble 5.44 million before the first public issue shares in August 
1999 to a phenomenal 236 million shares by January 2000, before the 
second public issue at $ 152.50 per share.102  After completion of the 
second public issue, the number of outstanding shares was about 245 
million.103  Of this, the total number of shares issued to the public was 
only 7.5 million (first issue) and 8.4 million (second issue), or less than ten 
percent! 
 
The insiders and their associates acquired their shares at a consideration of 
$ 1 or less, and shares of the same class were issued to the public at $ 38 in 
August 1999, and $ 152.50 in February 2000.  Neither corporate law nor 
securities law has anything to say on such issues.  On the contrary, 
                                                 
100 Sycamore quarterly report, note 81, above at p. 8. 
101 Sycamore registration statement, note 85, above at p. 18. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Sycamore quarterly statement, note 82, above at p. 3. 
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corporate law endorses the right of companies to indulge in such actions.  
The question is how the license in law for such practices defines the 
culture of corporations and the stock market, which are two important 
institutions in the society, and shapes their behaviour and the larger value 
systems in the society. 
 
The personal profit made by the insiders at dubious technology companies 
during the .com bubble was a matter of debate after the bubble burst in 
2001.104  It is reported that Gururaj Deshpande, the founder-chairman of 
Sycamore, raked in $ 726 million from the sale of his shares in the 
company.105 
 
B. PUBLIC ISSUES AND THEIR LEGITIMACY 
 
We have seen that Sycamore Networks had no ascertained need for capital 
for either of the two public issues made by it.  Taking advantage of the 
sentiment in the stock market favour of companies that had something to 
do with the Internet, Sycamore approached the stock market, twice in a 
span of seven months, and collected over one and a half billion dollars. 
 
Public issues of this variety raise the question of legitimacy of public 
issues of shares by companies.  The question of legitimacy of public issues 
is a longstanding one in the history of Anglo-American corporate law.  
The earliest official reference to public issues by dubious companies is 
found in a report of the Board of Trade in England, prepared in 1696.106  
In the United States, censoring of public issues was attempted in Kansas 
during early twentieth century, under the so-called “blue-sky laws.”107  
Companies required governmental clearance before they could make 
public issues. 
                                                 
104 See e.g. Mark Gimein “Greedy Bunch – You Bought They Sold” Fortune, 2 
September 2002. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Ronald Ralph Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1923) at 16. 
107 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, “Origin of the Blue-sky Laws” (1991) 
70 Texas L. Rev. 347. 
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The federal securities law regime, introduced in the 1930s, avoided such 
activist intervention, and stopped with requiring companies to make 
disclosures.  The present position is that if a company does not have any 
need for capital but still makes a public issue, it has to state so.  It is left to 
the investors to decide whether they want to invest in the shares of the 
company.  Securities regulations designate companies without any need 
for capital as “blank check companies,” and expressly permit to make 
public issues.108  However, such companies must deposit the proceeds 
from the issue in an escrow account or in specified securities.109 
 
The regulatory regime outlined above is clear that it would permit, rather 
than prevent public issues.  This is a basic issue with the Securities 
Regime, as it has developed.  It seeks to mostly to promote the stock 
market and trading transactions in the market.  The systemic checks are 
quite few and limited, and are called into play only in cases of gross abuse 
or fraud.  The securities regime is hardly concerned with the 
circumstances in which companies can approach the market.  In other 
words, it ignores the question of legitimacy of public issues.  
 
Sycamore Networks is an example of the consequences of this approach in 
which the law, representing public policy, has no concern for the 
legitimacy for public issues other than to require companies to state that 
they have no legitimate purpose for the issue!  Let us now look at what 
Sycamore has done with the large sum of money it collected from the 
public for no specific reason.  The following table gives the key financials 
of Sycamore since its second public issue in March 2000, until April 29, 
2006, which is the latest date for which the company has submitted 
reports, at this writing in June 2007.110 
 
Table 9 
                                                 
108 Ibid. Section 3(b)(3). 
109 Regulation C (17 CFR Part 230), Rule 419. 
110 Data are taken from the annual reports of Sycamore Networks in Form 10-K for the 
fiscal years ended July 29 of 2000-2005.  Data for April 2006 taken from the quarterly 
report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29, 2006.  Reports available online: 
www.sec.gov, under CIK # 0001092367, May 2007. 
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Sycamore Networks 
Financial Data 2000-2006 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
$ '000s (9 months)
Revenue 198 375 65 38 45 65 56
Operating results -11 -352 -395 -78 -61 -40 -4
Interest income 41 85 40 23 16 14 27
Net income 31 -267 -380 -55 -44 -25 23
Cash and investments 1,512 1,249 1,044 996 961 955 971
Shareholders' equity 1,575 1,388 1,039 993 955 940 977
 
 
It is apparent that Sycamore Networks has been utilizing the money it 
collected from the public issues for funding the operating losses incurred 
by it year after year.  Its business has been a nonstarter.  As of April 2006, 
there was a balance of $ 971 million, against the original sum of $ 1,512 
million collected from the public issues in 1999 and 2000.  More than $ 
500 million have been expended in the period of six years, during which 
shareholders’ equity declined from $ 1,575 million (2000) to $ 977 million 
(2006). 
 
If we were to be guided by the registration statements of Sycamore, the 
outcome indicated by the financial results is not surprising.  After all, the 
company did eloquently describe how bleak it expected its future to be, 
and its expectations have not been belied!  Given the track record and 
tendencies of Sycamore, it was inevitable that lawsuits would be filed 
against it in connection with its public issues.  Filed they were in July 
2001, less than eighteen months after the second public issue, made in 
February-March 2000.  The company made its first statement about the 
class actions filed against it in its report for the quarter ended April 29, 
2001: 
 
The amended complaint [against the company] alleges violations 
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, primarily based on the 
assertion that the Company’s lead underwriters, the Company and 
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the other named defendants made material false and misleading 
statements in the Company’s Registration Statements and 
Prospectuses filed with the SEC in October 1999 and March 2000 
because of the failure to disclose (a) the alleged solicitation and 
receipt of excessive and undisclosed commissions by the 
underwriters in connection with the allocation of shares of 
common stock to certain investors in the allocation of shares of 
common stock to certain investors in the Company’s public 
offerings and (b) that certain of the underwriters allegedly had 
entered into agreements with investors whereby underwriters 
agreed to allocate the public offering shares in exchange for which 
the investors agreed to make additional purchases of stock in the 
aftermarket at predetermined prices.111 
 
These were the facts alleged against the company, and its response to the 
litigation was typically vague, evasive and non-committal.  It stated: 
 
The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit 
and intends to defend against the complaints vigourously.  The 
Company is not currently able to estimate the possibility of loss or 
range of loss, if any, relating to these claims.112 
 
But Sycamore Networks reneged on its statement about defending the 
claims, and has opted to make a settlement.  This raises questions about 
the seriousness with which it made the above statement, and the 
complicity of the officers of the company in the wrongful acts alleged 
against them.  The latest statutory report filed by Sycamore Networks is 
for the quarter ended April 29, 2006, and it has information about the 
litigation.  The following extracts from the report explain the current 
position: 
 
                                                 
111 Sycamore Networks quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29, 
2002, at p. 31.  Available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000092701602003167/0000927016-
02-003167.txt, May 2007. 
112 Ibid. 
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The Company, the Individual Defendants, the plaintiff class and 
the vast majority of the other approximately three hundred issuer 
defendants and the individual defendants currently or formerly 
associated with those companies approved a settlement and related 
agreements (the “Settlement Agreement”) which set forth the terms 
of a settlement between these parties. Among other provisions, the 
Settlement Agreement provides for a release of the Company and 
the Individual Defendants for the conduct alleged in the action to 
be wrongful and for the Company to undertake certain 
responsibilities, including agreeing to assign away, not assert, or 
release, certain potential claims the Company may have against its 
underwriters. In addition, no payments will be required by the 
issuer defendants under the Settlement Agreement to the extent 
plaintiffs recover at least $1 billion from the Underwriter 
Defendants, who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement.113 
 
But that is not the full story.  Sycamore went on: 
 
On March 20, 2006, the Underwriter Defendants submitted 
objections to the settlement to the Court. The Court held a hearing 
regarding these and other objections to the settlement at a fairness 
hearing on April 24, 2006, but it has not yet issued a ruling. There 
is no assurance that the court will grant final approval to the 
settlement. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved and the 
Company is found liable, we are unable to estimate or predict the 
potential damages that might be awarded, whether such damages 
would be greater than the Company’s insurance coverage, and 
whether such damages would have a material impact on our results 
of operations or financial condition in any future period.114 
 
At this writing in May 2007, Sycamore Networks is under an investigation 
ordered by the audit committee of its board of directors with respect to 
                                                 
113 Sycamore Networks quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29, 
2002, at p. 40.  Available online: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000119312506118073/d10q.htm#tx93
808_11, May 2007. 
114 Ibid. at p. 41. 
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grant of stock options, and has not filed statutory reports since April 2006.  
Its shares were in danger of being de-listed from Nasdaq due to the failure 
to furnish reports, but the action has been temporarily stayed.115 
 
The events at Sycamore clearly illustrate the absence of responsible 
management in the company, and its opportunistic use of the stock market 
to make money, both for the company and its insiders.  There is also 
empirical evidence that opportunistic corporate behaviour with respect to 
the stock market quite often translates into business failure.116 
 
When we speak about legitimacy of public issues, it is not in any sense 
abstract.  Thereby hang much larger issues, such as responsible corporate 
management, use of the stock market to raise capital for genuine and 
beneficial economic purposes, serious as against speculative investment in 
corporate shares, and so on.  In other words, we are talking about the 
whole philosophy that underlies the stock market and corporate 
arrangements.  We briefly touch upon these issues in the concluding part 
of the paper. 
 
IV. AMAZON.COM 
 
Amazon.com, a pioneer in trade through the Internet, or “e-commerce,” 
entered the stock market during the late 1990s riding on the Internet boom.  
It made a relatively small public issue of $ 54 million in May 1997.  The 
price of Amazon.com shares consistently rose during 1997-2001, contrary 
to the business reports of company, which betrayed an equally consistent 
worsening of its financial position. 
 
The case of Amazon.com has some similarities with Sycamore Networks, 
which we have just discussed, but the distinctions between the two 
                                                 
115 Sycamore Networks press release “Sycamore Granted Stay to Remain Listed on 
Nasdaq” 17 April 2007, available online: 
http://www.sycamorenet.com/corporate/news/index.asp?id=pressrelease&command=live
&news_item_id=832, May 2007. 
116 See e.g. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, “Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence” [1992] U. Ill. L. Rev. 691. 
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companies are more striking.  Amazon.com was founded in 1994, before 
the Internet boom gathered momentum in the stock market, and made its 
public issue in 1997.  Sycamore Networks, on the other hand, was founded 
in 1998 at the height of the Internet boom, and made two public issues in 
the following years –1999 and 2000. 
 
Amazon.Com was originally incorporated in the state of Washington, and 
shifted its incorporation to Delaware just before its public issue in 1997.  
This indicates that a public issue of shares was not the primary 
consideration for the company.  But it was different with Sycamore 
Networks, which was formed in Delaware.  Quite obviously, the plan was 
to take advantage of the market sentiment in favour of technology 
companies, and make public issues as quickly as possible.  In this plan of 
Sycamore Networks, Delaware’s loose corporate law regime was an 
important element. 
 
A second feature was that Jeffrey Bezos, the founder of Amazon.com, was 
particular about retaining control of the company even after the public 
issue, and prominently highlighted his intentions in the registration 
statement filed for the public issue made by the company in 1997.  This 
indicates a degree of commitment on the part of Jeffrey Bezos to the 
company.  Bezos laid emphasis on the long term, and in his first annual 
letter to the investors after the public issue, he warned: 
 
Because of our emphasis on the long term, we may make decisions 
and weigh tradeoffs differently than some companies. Accordingly, 
we want to share with you our fundamental management and 
decision-making approach so that you, our shareholders, may 
confirm that it is consistent with your investment philosophy.117 
 
The letter from which the passage is extracted was written by Jeffrey 
Bezos in March 1998, and the progress achieved by Amazon.com in the 
last ten years, which we trace in the course of our discussion here, is 
standing testimony to the business philosophy of the company.  In 
contrast, we have seen that the operations of Sycamore Networks, a 
                                                 
117 Jeffrey Bezos’ letter dated March 30, 1998, to the shareholders of Amazon.Com, at p. 
2.  Available online: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-
reportsAnnual, May 2007. 
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younger company which collected over $ 1.5 billion from the market are 
paralyzed, and the company is in decline.  Amazon.com has been 
successful in establishing an e-commerce model for retail sales, and has 
displayed considerable grit and energy in the process of doing so. 
 
A. AMAZON.COM PUBLIC ISSUE 
 
As we noted earlier, Amazon.com, founded in 1994, made its initial and 
only public issue in May 1997.  Three million shares, a relatively small 
number representing about a sixth of the total number shares outstanding 
after the issue, were offered to the public.  The issue price targeted by the 
company was $ 13 per share, but in the febrile conditions which prevailed 
in the market at the time of the issue, the company was able to get a price 
of $ 18.  The net proceeds from the issue, after deducting issue expenses, 
were about $ 49 million.118 
 
The market was apparently optimistic about Amazon.com and its 
prospects, going by the fact that the price of $ 18 offered by it was more 
than the company’s target of $ 13.  To assess how far the optimism was in 
accord with the disclosures made and information provided by 
Amazon.com, we must turn to the registration statement filed by it for the 
public issue.  The registration statement started on a positive note, 
referring to “the opportunity for online book retaining,” and the belief of 
Amazon.com that the retail book industry is particularly suited to online 
retailing for many compelling reasons.”119  The company affirmed its 
intention “to use technology to deliver an outstanding service offering and 
to achieve the significant economies inherent in the online store model.”  
It also reported that it had “grown rapidly since opening its first 
bookstore.”120 
                                                 
118 Amazon.com quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1997, at p. 
7.  Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891020-97-
001148.txt, May 2007. 
119 Amazon.com registration statement in Form S-1, March 24, 1997, at p. 4.  Available 
online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891618-97-001309.txt, 
May 2007. 
120 Ibid. 
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These statements reflect a sense of purpose and commitment, which were 
noticeably lacking in Sycamore Networks.  But Amazon.com, like 
Sycamore Networks, had an accumulated deficit at the time of filing its 
registration statement, and it was to the tune of $ 9 million.  Again like 
Sycamore Networks, Amazon.com also had no specific business needs for 
raising capital from the market through a public issue of its shares.  It 
described the use of proceeds from the public issue in the following 
words: 
 
The principal purposes of this offering are to obtain additional 
capital, to create a public market for the Common Stock, to 
facilitate future access by the Company to public equity markets, 
and to provide increased visibility and credibility in a marketplace 
where many of the Company's current and potential competitors 
are or will be publicly held companies. The Company has no 
specific plan for the net proceeds of the offering. The Company 
expects to use the net proceeds for general corporate purposes, 
including working capital to fund anticipated operating losses and 
capital expenditures.121 
 
Amazon.com made no efforts to hide the fact that it looked to the public 
issue for enhancing its profile.  This is an illustration of the consequences 
of engineering corporations as finance mechanisms, rather than business 
vehicles.  Public issue of shares and their listing on stock exchanges 
emerge as ends in themselves, and cease to be means for business ends – 
namely, raising capital for business needs.  Amazon.com made the 
following further statements with respect to use of proceeds from the 
public issue. 
 
A portion of net proceeds may also be used to acquire or invest in 
complementary businesses, products and technologies. From time 
to time, in the ordinary course of business, the Company expects to 
evaluate potential acquisitions of such businesses, products or 
technologies. However, the Company has no present 
                                                 
121 Ibid. at p. 14. 
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understandings, commitments or agreements with respect to any 
material acquisitions or investments.122 
 
These statements indicate that the company might use the proceeds from 
the issue to advance its strategy of business development through 
acquisitions.  Amazon.com did, in fact, embark on a path of business 
growth through acquisitions, but hardly used the proceeds from the public 
issue for the purpose.  Instead, it went on a spree of issuing fresh shares to 
acquire new businesses, as we will see in Section (c), below. 
 
In describing the risk factors, Amazon.com shared the “gloom-and-doom” 
approach of Sycamore.  The risk factors were described with eloquence 
bordering on relish, and a very uncertain future was predicted for the 
company.123  The tendency of companies like Amazon.com and Sycamore 
Networks to take pains to paint bleak futures is an unintended 
consequence of the informational regime, and stresses the need for a more 
refined regulatory approach.  The requirement for disclosure of risk factors 
is used as a shield for issuers, rather than a source of information to the 
investors. 
 
But the market was unfazed by the gloomy future predicted by 
Amazon.com, and rewarded the company with a price of $ 18 per share.  
The public issue of Amazon.com was successful.  Not only did the market 
improve upon the expectations of Amazon.com with respect to the issue 
price, there were also huge increases in the price of Amazon.com shares 
when trading started in the stock exchanges during the heady days of 
Internet boom. 
 
The public issue was undoubtedly effective in improving the financial 
position of the existing shareholders of Amazon.com.  The company had 
over 15 million shares of common stock outstanding at the time of its 
public issue.  In addition, its preferred stock had conversion rights on 
completion of the public issue, and the number of shares held by existing 
holders was over 20 million after the public issue.  At the issue price of $ 
                                                 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. at p. 5-13. 
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18 per share, the existing shareholders of Amazon.com were, in theory, 
put in control of liquid assets of the market value of about $ 360 million. 
 
The public issue gave the shares of Amazon.com a ready value and 
“liquidity,” or the ability to convert the shares into cash by sale in the 
stock market.  These would prove to be crucial for the business 
development plans of Amazon.com in the following years, when the 
company used the market value of its shares to acquire a number of 
businesses.  The business development strategy of Amazon.com and its 
implications are the subject of Section (c), below. 
 
B. AMAZON SHARE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS 
 
Amazon.com shares issued in May 1997 at $ 18 per share reached $ 100 in 
a year.  The company apparently treated the $ 100 price level as a 
watershed, and resorted to a two-for-one stock split in June 1998.124  The 
number of Amazon.com shares doubled, but there was no let up in the 
enthusiasm of the market.  In December 1998, six months after the split, 
the price reached a high of over $ 360, and in the next month, January 
1999, Amazon.com effected a second split, this time three-for-one.  The 
number of its shares simply tripled! 
 
The market took the second split also in its stride, and maintained the price 
of Amazon.com shares at over $ 100 almost all through 1999, with the 
price reaching a peak of $ 222 in April 1999.  Only in August 1999, the 
price fell marginally below the $ 100 mark, to $ 98, and this lasted for a 
short while.  Amazon.com resorted to yet another stock-split in the next 
month, September 1999, this time in the ratio of two-for-one.  After this 
third round, the company has not made any stock-splits.  Amazon.com 
shares touched a low of about $ 6 in August 2001 when the .com bubble in 
                                                 
124 We have earlier referred to the fact that Amazon.com shifted its incorporation from 
Washington to Delaware, just before the public issue in May 1997.  The decision of 
Amazon.com to shift its incorporation to Delaware clearly indicated its intention to take 
full advantage of the lax and pro-stock market corporate law regime of Delaware.  
Delaware General Corporation Law (Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1) does not 
specifically enable or authorize stock splits, but it recognizes the concept (Section 173). 
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the stock market burst, but it has gradually gained ground thereafter.  At 
this writing in June 2007, the price is about $ 70 per share.125 
 
Let us now take a look at the financials of Amazon.com, to understand 
how they relate with the movement in share prices during the first five 
years of trading in the shares of the company.126 
 
Table 10 
 
Amazon.com  
Business Data: 1997-2001 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
($ '000s)
1 Sales 148 610 1640 2762 3122
2 Operating results -33 -112 -606 -864 -412
3 Net Income -31 -125 -720 -1411 -567
 
 
If we were to be guided by the principles of investment outlined by 
Graham and Dodd,127 which pay close attention to earnings and dividends, 
the shares of Amazon.com would be a nonstarter.  The company was 
incurring huge losses during the period, and there was no question of any 
dividend.  Nonetheless, the price of its shares saw runaway increases, 
which cannot be supported by the financial results reflected in the above 
table.  Amazon.com was building up losses, and was able to survive only 
                                                 
125 Historical prices of Amazon.com, and dates of stock-splits available online: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AMZN, May 2007. 
126 Data taken from the annual reports of Amazon.com in Form 10-K for the respective 
years.  Forms available online: http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?type=10-
k&dateb=&owner=include&count=40&action=getcompany&CIK=0001018724, June 
2007. 
127 Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, Security Analysis, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 
1934) 
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by taking on huge debt.  But as we noted earlier, the new theory was that 
the conventional approach to investment in the stock market128 was not 
valid for technology companies; the high valuation given by the market for 
technology companies was because of their future potential, rather than 
current fundamentals.129  This takes us to the question of forecasts made 
by Amazon.com during the period. 
 
The forecasts made by the company in the statutory reports filed during 
this period were on the side of pessimism.  The report for 1998,130 which 
presented the forecasts for 1999, is a good example of the trend.  It began 
with statements on “anticipated losses”131 and “unpredictability of future 
revenues,”132 and these were followed up with forecasts of the following 
variety: 
 
[t]he Company believes that it will continue to incur substantial 
operating losses for the foreseeable future and that the rate at 
which such losses will be incurred may increase significantly from 
current levels. Although the Company has experienced significant 
revenue growth in recent periods, such growth rates are not 
sustainable and will decrease in the future.133 
 
Due to the foregoing factors, in one or more future quarters the 
Company's operating results may fall below the expectations of 
                                                 
128 It is an open question how far there are any conventions or standards with respect to 
investment in the stock market.  Speculation and irrational prices have always been 
present in the financial markets ever since they came into existence in England in the late 
seventeenth century.  See generally Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation 
1690-1860: Political and Cultural Roots (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
and Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation 
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999). 
129 For a critique of the argument that technology companies had some hidden potential 
for enormous future profits, see William Bonner and Addison Wiggin, note 44, above. 
130 Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891020-98-
000448.txt, May 2007. 
131 Ibid. at p. 5. 
132 Ibid. at p. 6. 
133 Ibid. at p. 15. 
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securities analysts and investors. In such event, the trading price of 
the common stock would likely be materially adversely affected.134 
 
We have already referred to the fact that Amazon.com was borrowing 
heavily to sustain its operations.  It also disclosed that the agreements with 
its lenders placed restrictions on payment of “dividends and distributions 
to the stockholders.” This made the payment of dividends doubtful as long 
as the company carried debt.  Adding to the air of gloom, Amazon.com 
also stated that the terms of its contract with the lenders “may reduce the 
Company's operational flexibility and may limit its ability to pursue 
market opportunities.”135  These were as far as the disclosures in statutory 
documents went.  The tone and contents of other communications from the 
company were somewhat different. 
 
Jeffrey Bezos’ annual letter to the shareholders written in March 1999, 
around the same time when the statutory report was filed, had little of the 
attitude of caution and pessimism which characterized the statutory report.  
Instead, the letter displays considerable optimism and a “will-do” spirit.  
The letter written in March 1999 continued with the emphasis on the long-
term seen in the previous year’s letter, and asserted that: 
 
Amazon.com has made a number of strides forward in the past 
year, but there is still an enormous amount to learn and to do. We 
remain optimistic, but we also know we must remain vigilant and 
maintain a sense of urgency. We face many challenges and 
hurdles.  Among them, aggressive, capable and well-funded 
competition; the growth challenges and execution risk associated 
with our own expansion; and the need for large continuing 
investments to meet an expanding market opportunity. 
 
The dichotomy between the tone and contents of the statutory report and 
statements made in the letter to the shareholders raise the same question 
we have raised earlier with respect to Enron and Sycamore Networks – 
which is the information that influences the stock market?  If it is the 
practice of the market to mostly rely on non-official information, then 
                                                 
134 Ibid. at p. 16. 
135 Ibid. at p. 30. 
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what is the whole point about the elaborate reporting mechanism 
mandated under securities law?136 
 
To reiterate, the increases seen in the price of Amazon.com shares cannot 
be explained by the information contained in its statutory reports.  As we 
will see a little later, the company continued to issue shares every year, 
which added to the volume of shares in circulation.  According to 
conventional economic theory with respect to demand, supply and prices, 
increases in supply ought to have resulted in lower prices, but that did not 
happen.  On the contrary, prices continued to climb.  This would indicate 
that demand increased at a quicker pace than supply, and the result was 
increase in prices even as the supply position improved. 
 
A reason for the selection of Amazon.com as a case for study is, as noted 
earlier, the forecast made by Henry Blodget.  Blodget was, at that time, an 
investment analyst working for the investment firm CIBC Oppenheimer.  
During late 1998, at the height of the Internet boom in the stock market, he 
made his famous forecast that Amazon shares would reach a price level of 
$ 400.137    Blodget made no reference to the fundamentals of the company 
while making his prediction about the price of its shares. 
 
Apparently, Henry Blodget’s forecast for the shares of Amazon.com was 
based on the demand-supply position for Internet stocks in the stock 
market of the time.138  This is rather strange, because we have not been 
told by the efficient market theorists that demand and supply conditions in 
the market could affect share prices, or that the demand for the shares of 
companies could exist independently of the information available about 
them.  In other words, there could be a huge demand for the shares of a 
company despite negative information reported by the company.  Just to 
                                                 
136 On this question, see generally Susan M. Phillips, The SEC and the Public Interest 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). 
137 Dan Mitchell & Scott Martin, “Amazon up 46 percent; report “clarified,’” 16 
December 1998.  Available online: http://news.com.com/2100-1017-219176.html, May 
2007. 
138 This is supported by the statements Henry Blodget made in “If I knew then what I 
know now” interview with eCompany Now, March 2001.  Available online: 
http://www.timeinc.net/b2/subscribers/articles/print/0,17925,513201,00.html, May 2007. 
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make sure, we reexamined the Efficient Market Hypothesis,139 but not 
could find any reference. 
 
According to the Efficient Markets theory, it is information and only 
information that will guide the market.  For reasons that are not clear, the 
market apparently believed that Henry Blodget was privy to some special 
information which was not known to others or that he had some prescience 
which others lacked, and readily accepted his guidance.140  Amazon.com 
shares did not reach the target of $ 400 set for them by Blodget, but at $ 
362, they came close enough.  This is an illustration of the characteristic of 
reflexivity of the stock market, or its tendency for self-fulfilling 
prophecies, which has been pointed out by writers like George Soros141 
and Robert Shiller.142  Quite often, share prices rise only because the 
market expects them to rise. 
 
C. AMAZON’S BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MODEL AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
The business of Amazon.com has indeed grown rapidly.  We have seen 
that its sales climbed from $ 148 million in 1997 to $ 3,122 million in 
2001.  Sales have since grown to $ 10,711 billion in 2006.  Let us now 
take a look at the strategy employed by Amazon.com for its business 
growth.  Table 11 below presents data with respect to the capital, long-
term debt and “goodwill and other purchased intangibles” of Amazon.com 
for the period 1997-2001.143   
                                                 
139 Eugene Fama, Note 25, above. 
140 Henry Blodget has since been found guilty of market manipulation and is permanently 
barred from participating in the stock market. See SEC press release dated April 28, 
2003.  Available online: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-56.htm, June 2007. 
141 George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered (New York: 
Public Affairs, 1998). 
142 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (New York: Broadway Books, 2001). 
143 Data taken from balance sheets of respective years, available in annual reports in Form 
10-K filed by Amazon.com, note 126, above.  Particulars of stock issued for business 
acquisition taken from the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows in the annual report for 
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Table 11 
 
Amazon.com 
 Share Capital and Related Data: 1997-2001 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
($ '000s)
1 Value of stock issued for 0 217 774 32 5
business acquisitions
2 Goodwill and intangibles 0 229 766 47 80
 acquired or added  
3 Goodwill and intangibles 43 215 522 363
amortized or written off
4 Long-term debt 77 348 1466 2127 2156
5 Total paid-in capital 68 302 1198 1342 1467
6 Accumulated deficit -38 -162 -882 -2293 -2861
7 Shareholders' equity 29 139 266 -967 -1440
8 No.of outstanding shares 145 318 345 357 373
 
 
In a span of four years from 1998 to 2001, Amazon.com issued shares of 
the value of $ 1,028 million towards business acquisitions.  Issue of shares 
for business development through acquisitions was an effective strategy 
adopted by Amazon.com.  We have seen that the company had suggested 
in its registration statement filed in 1997 that it might apply a part of the 
proceeds from the public for acquisition of new businesses.  Apparently, it 
did not do so.  But it made use of the public issue and the resulting 
“liquid” character of its shares to go on a spree of acquisition of businesses 
by issuing its shares as the consideration. 
 
The shares of Amazon.com, as we have seen, traded at high prices during 
the period, and quite obviously, the persons who sold their businesses to 
Amazon.com were willing to accept the shares as consideration.  By 
issuing its shares towards purchase consideration, Amazon.com was able 
to acquire new businesses without any payment.  This was important 
because Amazon.com, with its huge losses and debt, was in no position to 
pay any monetary consideration.  As a business strategy, the issue of 
                                                                                                                         
1999, at p. 36.  The outstanding share numbers given in the table are after considering the 
three stock splits made by Amazon.com, one in 1998 and two in 1999. 
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shares for acquisition of businesses can hardly be faulted.  It was an 
effective method of acquiring business assets for the company. 
 
The issue of shares for acquisition of businesses in the manner described 
above leads some interesting results.  As we noted earlier, Amazon.com 
did not, in fact, could not pay any monetary consideration for its 
acquisitions.  Taking advantage of the high price of its shares in the stock 
market, the company issued shares as the consideration, and the persons to 
whom the shares were issued could sell them in the market if they wanted 
money.  In other words, Amazon.com successfully created an arrangement 
in which investors in the stock market will take care of payment for its 
business acquisitions, if the persons who sold their businesses to the 
company wanted cash. 
 
The business acquisitions made by Amazon.com were accounted under 
“goodwill and other purchased tangibles,” which is explained in the notes 
to the financial statements for 1998:144 
 
Goodwill and Other Purchased Intangibles 
  
Goodwill and other purchased intangibles represent the excess of 
the purchase price over the fair value of assets acquired. Total 
goodwill of approximately $215.7 million and other purchased 
intangibles of approximately $13.3 million are stated net of total 
accumulated amortization of $42.6 million at December 31, 1998 
in the accompanying balance sheet. 
 
It was also clarified that “goodwill and substantially all other purchased 
intangibles are being amortized on a straight-line basis over lives ranging 
from two to three years.”  This means that the asset, acquired at huge 
value by the issue of shares, would be worthless after a short period of two 
to three years.  True to its word, Amazon.com wrote off assets of the value 
of $ 1,122 million in the four years, 1997-2001. 
 
Amazon.com, having acquired assets worth over a billion dollars over four 
years and issued shares towards the consideration payable for them, wrote 
                                                 
144 Note 126, above. 
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off the assets and eliminated them from its financial statements.  This is 
recognition that the assets had lost their commercial value.  This was duly 
reflected in the huge deficits which the company accumulated, and in the 
erosion of its shareholders’ equity. 
 
However, the shares issued by Amazon.com for the acquisition of the 
assets that have been written off continue to circulate in the market, and 
they command significant value.  This is a curious situation, to put it 
mildly.  If we accept that the assets for which the shares were issued 
subsequently lost their value and were eliminated by the company, then 
there must be some impact on the shares issued towards their acquisition.  
But in the present arrangement, there is no such impact, and the shares 
continue in the market without the slightest disturbance.145 
 
It is difficult to characterize the wealth represented by the market value of 
the shares issued by Amazon.com as consideration for the assets which it 
acquired and subsequently eliminated.  A possible term would be 
“fictitious” or “artificial” wealth, but that would be hardly accurate.  After 
all, the wealth represented by these shares is real, and exists in the stock 
market; it is hardly fictitious or artificial in that sense.146  But the question 
is whether this variety of wealth, made possible by the legal arrangements 
in the society, is desirable. 
 
Before concluding, we must take note of the fact that the long-term 
commitment stressed by Jeffrey Bezos, the founder of Amazon.com, is 
paying off, and the company has consolidated its position in recent years.  
Its progress is evident from its business data for the last five years given in 
the table below, and they vindicate our earlier observation about the 
qualitative difference between Amazon.com and Sycamore Networks. 
                                                 
145 In a more responsible system, there would be a requirement that the portion of capital 
represented by the eliminated assets must also be eliminated.  As a result, the number of 
shares of the company would shrink proportionately, but such things are almost 
unthinkable in the stock market-dominated, libertarian corporate system now prevailing 
in the United States. 
146 In the context of the present monetary system in which money can be generated by the 
government at will, it is possible to argue that wealth is essentially artificial or fictitious.  
Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong with the “wealth” represented by the market 
value of the shares issued by a company towards assets that have been written off. 
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Table 12 
 
Amazon.com 
Business Data: 2002-2006 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
($ '000s)
1 Sales 3923 5264 6921 8490 10711
2 Operating results 64 270 440 432 389
3 Net Income -149 35 588 359 190
4 Long-term debt 2277 1945 1855 1480 1247
5 Total paid-in capital 1654 1893 2129 2267 2521
6 Accumulated deficit -3010 -2974 -2386 -2027 -1837 *
7 Shareholders' equity -1353 -1036 -227 246 431
8 No.of outstanding shares 388 403 410 414 416
* Amazon.com repurchased stock to the extent of $ 252 million.
 
Amazon.com is proof that e-commerce is basically a viable business 
model, and neither the commitment of Jeffrey Bezos, nor the faith of the 
investors is misplaced.  Amazon.com has done a good job of establishing 
the model, and has consolidated its business.  But the nagging question 
that remains is whether all this could have been done in a more responsible 
and healthier manner.  Could the business not have been developed 
without the stock market excesses, issue of shares by the company in a 
casual manner, speculative frenzy in the shares, and the resulting 
“fictitious” wealth to which we have referred?147  Now that the company is 
on the path to reasonable financial health, it has not lost any time in 
making efforts to influence the stock market, which is evident from the 
repurchase of stock made by it in 2006.  Amazon.com applied $ 252 
                                                 
147 To the extent that the practices of Amazon.com have contributed and continue to 
contribute to trade and “wealth creation” in the stock market, it is at least in line with 
governmental policy.  Since the late 1980s, the financial markets have emerged as the 
defining feature of the American system.  It has also been actively exported to other 
countries as part of the globalization movement.  See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, note 
26, above. 
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million for the repurchase, when its net income was $ 190 million and it 
still carried debts of over $ 1.2 billion. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The close relationship between business corporations and the stock market 
is a self-evident fact.148  The two institutions are governed by legislation; 
indeed, companies or corporations are the products of statutes, and would 
have no existence without sanction in law.  At present, there is little effort 
to regulate corporations.  Although an elaborate regulatory framework has 
been developed for the stock market, its effectiveness in checking market 
excesses and negative tendencies is questionable.  The case-studies 
reported in this paper offer additional evidence of the limitations of the 
present regulatory regime. 
 
The statutes under which corporations are created treat them almost 
exclusively as issuers of securities, and do not recognize any other role for 
them.  This narrow approach of the statute ignores the reality of the large 
role played by corporations in modern societies.  Lawrence E. Mitchell 
observed: 
 
The modern corporation is a social and political institution - an 
institution in which people go to work not only to make a living 
but to help find meaning and friendship in the process; an 
institution that by the products it produces, the services it offers, 
and the methods by which it markets them has an enormous effect 
on the way we think about our lives and the goals we pursue; an 
institution that involves itself in the mechanisms of government to 
help determine the ways our laws are made and the way our wealth 
is distributed.149 
                                                 
148 Indeed, the first official document on the subject, a report of the Board of Trade in 
England prepared in 1696, emphasized the relationship between the nascent stock market 
and joint-stock companies.  See note 106, above.  This has since been the theme of most 
literature on corporations.  See e.g. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, note 21, 
above. 
149 Lawrence E. Mitchell, note 52, above at p. 6-7 
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Corporate statutes pointedly ignore the reality of corporations described 
above, and confine themselves to (a) enabling the corporations to issue 
securities and (b) promoting trade in the securities in the stock market.  
Judge-made corporate law, another important source of law, is equally 
non-interventionist.  The defence of business judgment accepted by the 
courts precludes judicial interference in corporate decisions and actions, 
except in cases of gross abuse or fraud.  Courts are mostly concerned with 
the narrow fiduciary duties of corporate managements to the shareholders. 
Other than this, corporations have near-complete freedom in arranging 
their business and affairs, which has been accurately summarized by 
Easterbrook and Fischel.150 
 
When we turn to the stock market, the elaborate regulatory framework that 
governs the market, as we have noted earlier, is mostly concerned with 
making corporate information available.  This approach, tried for the last 
70 and more years, has proven its inability to handle the periodic bouts of 
speculation which afflict the market, and the market’s tendency to set 
irrational and unsustainable price levels.  The prospect of increases in 
share price is a major temptation for managements to indulge in negative 
behaviour, and Enron is (fallen) testimony to this reality.  The theory that 
appraisal of share prices in the stock market would be guided by the 
information provided by companies151 is considerably undermined by the 
case-studies made in this essay. 
 
When we consider the question of a role for the stock market, we find that 
it has been all of the following: 
 
a. A source of capital for companies for their business needs 
b. A venue for the public to invest their savings profitably 
c. A platform for existing business owners to divest their holdings, 
and broad-base the ownership of business enterprises 
d. A forum for trade in the securities of corporations, and enabling 
liquidity for the holders 
                                                 
150 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, note 7, above. 
151 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, note 21, above. 
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e. A forum for trade in corporate control through large-scale, 
concerted transactions of purchase and sale of shares 
f. A significant influence on governance practices in corporations 
g. A veritable gambling den 
 
We must pause to question whether the present regulatory framework 
takes sufficient note of the multi-faceted role of the stock market, and 
whether it effectively deals with each of them.  We must also determine 
which of these various roles must be encouraged and which ones 
discouraged.  It would be a serious folly to have speculation in the stock 
market as the basis for economic arrangements or for “wealth creation” of 
a dubious variety.  The need of the hour is a theory for the stock market 
that reflects policy choices made in a reasoned manner with due regard to 
the interests of all stakeholders. 
 
Instability in the stock market and unhealthy corporate governance are two 
major current issues, and the present arrangements have proven that they 
are not capable of addressing them.  The need of the hour is, therefore, 
legal reform of the two institutions – business corporations and the stock 
market.  The reform effort must take into account the experience which we 
have gained with them, and pay sufficient attention to the practical 
consequences of the present arrangements and their underlying 
philosophy. 
 
The prevailing political climate is hardly encouraging, and there can be 
little optimism on the prospects for reform.  On the contrary, we can 
expect that the very mention of legal reform will provoke strong protests 
from business interests, supported by libertarian scholars.  But the issues at 
stake are too important to be left in the hands of entrenched special 
interests and their supporters, although this has been the case for most of 
the last thirty years.  We must, therefore, persist with a debate on reform, 
regardless of how bright or bleak the prospects for actual reform might 
appear to be.  The case for the legal reform of corporations and the stock 
market is strengthened by the following: 
 
a. Business corporations are creatures of law, and when these 
creatures of law engage in harmful acts, it would be quite 
legitimate for the law to regulate them.  The clear and undisputed 
status of business corporations as products of law, rather than 
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private arrangements provides a strong theoretical justification for 
the efforts to regulate them.  Such regulation would not, in any 
way, curtail the liberties of the people. 
 
b. Stock market is the forum for trade in the securities issued by 
corporations.  The market might be a societal arrangement that 
emerged without state intervention and the laws might have played 
little role in its emergence, but the subject of trade in the market 
are securities issued by corporations, which are legal creatures.  
The stock market hardly deals in natural commodities like food 
grains and vegetables, or manufactured commodities like textiles 
or industrial products.  The securities traded in the stock market are 
legal instruments that have special characteristics in law, and they 
greatly influence and shape the trends and tendencies in the 
market.  This distinction calls for a special variety of regulation.152 
 
The first step in a meaningful reform effort would be to formulate sound 
theories about the two institutions, in terms of the role that we expect them 
to play.  This variety of theorizing about the law and legal framework, and 
preparing elaborate legal codes are alien to the common law tradition, 
which prefers to rely on spontaneous arrangements emerging in the society 
endogenously.  While such a conception of the law would be natural and 
quite appropriate for self-contained local communities, they would be out 
of place even in small, nation-states, not to speak of the vast, 
interconnected and globalized society of the present. 
 
Experience shows the limitations of the bureaucratic, command-and-
control method of regulation tried in the last about 150 years of the 
welfare state, more particularly since the New Deal.153  But there is also 
                                                 
152 Such complex arguments are necessitated by the doctrinal divide between “public” 
and “private” in the Anglo-American legal tradition.  In more integral systems, they 
would not be as important.  Moreover, with the adoption of democratic forms of 
government in which the laws are made by elected assemblies, the theory is that the laws 
represent the consciousness of the people, rather than “commands of the sovereign.”  For 
this reason, the distinction between public and private ought to diminish, if not get 
effaced. 
153 See e.g. Milton & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980). 
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increasing realization that the deregulation tried since the 1980s and 
enlargement of the role of the state that has accompanied the process have 
mostly benefited the special interests which either hold or are close to 
controlling power.154  It is, therefore, vital that any roadmap for reform 
avoids dogmatic and doctrinaire approaches either in favour of or against 
regulation, and works towards solutions that advance the common good, 
rather than special interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
154 See e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, note 26, above. 
